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61  Introduction
The Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
could be said to be great success of the United States (hereinafter “US”) and
other developed countries. Debating over the TRIPS has started since 1994.
Debate is especially intensive in TRIPS’ relation with public health concern.
TRIPS has set considerably high minimum standards for patent protection, which
is objectively in favour of developed countries and multinational pharmaceutical
enterprises. On the other hand, developing countries, especially those that are
likely to have public health problems, need affordable drugs from different
sources, among which competent local pharmaceutical industry is the most
reliable source. Thus addressing public health crisis and fostering national
pharmaceutical industry are two main and connected challenges most developing
countries face when joining the TRIPS.
Both challenges have been reflected not only in the law suits over the new act
dealing with HIV/AIDS crisis in the South Africa, the US-India Patent legislation
dispute and the Canadian generic pharmaceutical case in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB), but have also been reflected in debates in international
forums such as WTO and WHO.
China started its market economic in the early 1990s. The nascent and non-
market oriented national pharmaceutical industry is still in a painful transformation.
Because of the incompetence of the health insurance system, the affordability of
pharmaceutical products is incredibly low. Similar public health crisis as happened
in the South Africa is also very likely to break out in China.
Standing in a public health friendly perspective and bearing fostering national
pharmaceutical industry in mind, the paper tries to analyse the international
obligations of China and make adjustment to current Chinese patent system.
Part two of the paper presents the history of Chinese patent legislations with focus
on interaction with the US foreign trade policy. Part three analyses international
obligations of China on intellectual property protection, with focus on the flexibility
of TRIPS and the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention). In part four, the well-known lawsuit over the South African act
dealing with the HIV/AIDS crisis shall be analysed. The 1970 India patent Act,
together with India’s struggle with the US, shall be analysed as well. The Fifth
part evaluates current Chinese patent legislation in the light of international
standards.  With the intention to make adjustment in public health concern, patent
subject matters, patentability and exceptions to exclusive rights in the Chinese
patent system shall be evaluated.
72 The Historical Development of the
Chinese Patent Legislation
China has experienced the transformation from a communist economy to a
socialism market economy. Accordingly, its patent legislation has undergone
radical evolution. Since1978, Chinese patent legislations have also been under
constant pressure of US foreign trade policy.
This part of the paper shall first present the legislation history of patent protection
in China, witnessing the transformation from communism to a market economy.
Secondly, the frequent interaction between the US foreign trade policy and the
Chinese patent legislation shall be analysed. Thirdly, the administrative protection
system for foreign pharmaceuticals, as a unique specimen of legislation under US
pressure and important patent legislation covering the period from 1984 to 1993,
shall be analysed in detail.
2.1 Development of National Legislations
During the period of Republic of China, the most important patent legislation was
the 1944 Patent Law of the Republic of China, however not many patents were
granted under this statute. 1 After the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China, from 1950 to 1978, a series of patent legislations of communism nature
had been promulgated. In 1963, the Regulation on Awards for Technical
Improvements made all inventions the property of the state and permitted free use
of all inventions. 2 In 1978, two years after the death of Chairman Mao,
modifications in the regulation allowed actual inventors to receive rewards for
their work, although free use of all inventions was still allowed. 3
China established its State Patent Bureau (hereinafter SPB) in 1980 - two years
after amending its patent laws.  4This effort paved the way for the passage of the
Patent Law of the People's Republic of China by the National People's Congress
                                                
1 See Robert G. Oake, Jr., A Primer on Chinese Patent Law (1994) <
http://www.oake.com/primer.htm>.
2 See id, at 452
3 See Ramona L. Taylar, Tearing Down the Great Wall: China’s Road to WTO Accession,
The Journal of Law and Technology (2001)
4 See Ross J. Oehler, Note, Patent Law in the People's Republic of China: A Primer, 8
N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 451, 455 (1987).
8on March 12, 1984. 5 Coming into force on April 1, 1985, Chinese Patent Law
provided protection for a variety of inventions. 6 The law spelled out three
requirements for patentability: "Any invention or utility model for which patent
rights may be granted must possess novelty, inventiveness and practical
applicability." 7 However, the 1984 Patent Law expressly excluded the following
categories from patent protection: scientific discoveries; rules and methods for
mental activities; methods for the diagnosis or for the treatment of diseases; food,
beverages and flavourings; pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by
means of chemical process; animal and plant varieties and substances obtained by
means of nuclear transformation. 8 The exclusion of pharmaceutical products and
substances obtained by means of chemical process meant that certain chemical
inventions could not be protected under the 1984 Patent Law. 9 It actually
includes, inter alia, new pharmaceutical compounds per se, 10 compositions or
mixtures of pharmaceutical products11 and agricultural compounds per se. 12
Patent applications for new uses of known pharmaceutical compounds were
treated inconsistently in practice. Some Chinese patent examiners routinely
rejected such new use claims, 13 while other Chinese patent examiners would
approve them if all requirements for patentability were met. 14
A patent law existed in China from April 1, 1985 to January 1, 1993, but it
provided little protection for pharmaceutical or agricultural products. Other
provisions in the 1984 Patent Law (both preceding and following the 1992
revisions) are similar to their US or Europe counterparts. As in the US or Europe,
Chinese patent law also grants twenty years monopoly to inventors from the date
of filing. 15 A Chinese patent shall be granted to the first person that files a patent
application, just like the European system. 16 However, business sectors in the US
expressed constant concern over inadequate protection of chemical inventions
during the period from 1985 to 1993.
                                                
5 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 4th Session of the Standing
Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress on Mar. 12, 1984 (hereinafter “1984
Patent Law”) See also J. Michael Warner & Han Xiaoqing, The Chinese System of
Administrative Protection for Pharmaceuticals, John Marshall Law Review (Summer 1998)
6 See Article 69 the 1984 Patent Law.
7 See Article 22 of the 1984 Patent Law.
8 See Article 25 of the 1984 Patent Law, supra note 15.
9 Li Luoying, Answers to Questions Concerning Patent Protection for Chemical Inventions
in China, China Pat. & Trademarks, 23 (April 1989)
10 Id, at 23
11 Id, at 23
12 Id, at 24
13 Id.
14 See J. Michael Warner & Han Xiaoqing, supra note 5
15 Id, Article 45
16 Id, Article 9
9In 1992, the 1984 Patent Law underwent its first revision under the pressure of
the US.17 Among other changes, Article 25 was modified to allow granting
patents to pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by means of
chemical process.18 Because of the 1992 amendment, new pharmaceutical
compounds per se, new uses for known pharmaceutical compounds,
pharmaceutical compositions, and agricultural compounds per se were eligible for
patent protection since January 1, 1993. 19
Facing the TRIPS, the Standing Committee of the 9th People’s Congress
amended the 1984 Patent Law for the second time on 25th August 2000. 20 In the
2000 Amendment, “offering for sale” has been included in the exclusive rights of a
patent holder. A third party is prohibited from offering the patented products for
sale without the authorization of the patent holder. 21 The 2000 Amendment also
explicitly provides that although the invention belongs to the Unit (danwei) when it
is invented during the work of the inventor, the inventor must be remunerated. 22
The 2000 Amendment also provides detailed methods of calculating
compensation. 23 Furthermore, it admits that the decisions of the SPB may be
subjected to judiciary review. 24
2.2 Pressure from the US
The Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and
the People's Republic of China of 1979 25 ("1979 Agreement") marked the
beginning of Western intellectual property protection in post-Mao China.
Pursuant to this Agreement, China became a member of the World Intellectual
Property Organisation ("WIPO Convention") in 1980 and of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1984. (“Paris Convention)
                                                
17 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, amended by the Decision Regarding the
Revision of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 27th Session of
the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on September 4, 1992.
(hereinafter, “the 1992 Amendment”) In 1996 the Patent Law of the People's Republic of
China underwent a second revision, the specifics of which are not relevant to the scope of
this paper.
18 Id, Article 25
19 Id, Article 69
20 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, amended by the Decision of Decision
Regarding the Revision of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the
17th Session of the Standing Committee of the ninth National People's Congress on August
25th, 2000 (hereinafter “the 2000 Amendment)
21 Id, Article 11
22 Id, Article 6
23 Id, Article 60
24 Id, Article 41
25 Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s
Republic of China of 1979, July 1979, P.R.C.-U.S., U.S.T. 4652 (hereinafter “the 1979
Agreement”)
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26China also promulgated a new trademark law 27 in 1982 and a new patent Law
in 1984.28
By the mid-1980s, the United States' attitude had changed. 29 Impatient with the
lack of improvement in intellectual property protection in China, the American
government started to look for pro-active solutions seeking to solve the Chinese
piracy problem. Among the various solutions was Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974 30Aiming to eliminate unfair trade practices and to open foreign markets,
31Section 301 permits the U.S. President to investigate and impose sanctions on
countries engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the United States'
economic interests. 32
In 1988, Congress introduced the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 33
which amended Section 301 by including two new provisions--Super 301 and
Special 301. 34 Super 301 required the United States Trade Representative
("USTR") to review U.S. trade expansion priorities and identify priority foreign
country practices that pose major barriers to U.S. exports. 35Special 301 targets
only unfair trade practices concerning intellectual property rights. Special 301
requires the USTR to identify foreign countries that provide inadequate intellectual
property protection or that deny American intellectual property goods fair or
equitable market access. 36 Since the introduction of Super 301 and Special 301,
the American government has used these Acts repeatedly to pressure foreign
countries to reform their intellectual property legislations. 37
In 1989, the USTR placed China on the "Priority Watch List." 38 In response to
the Priority Watch List designation, China passed a new copyright law 39and
                                                
26 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20 1883, as last revised
at the Stockholm revision Conference, July 14, 1967,
<http://www.wipo.org/treaties/documents/english/word/d-paris.doc> (hereinafter “the Paris
Convention)
27Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the
Twenty-First Century, American University Law Review 136 (2002)
28 1984 Patent Law, supra note 5
29 See Peter K. Yu, supra note 27
30 19 U.S.C Sec.2411-2420 (1994)
31 Id
32 Id
33 See 19 U.S.C Sec. 2101-2495( 1994)
34 Judith Hippler Bello &Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative
History of the Amendments to Section 301, in Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301
Trade Policy and the World Trading System 113, 113 (1st ed., 1990)
35 See 19 U.S.C Sec. 2420(a) (1) (A)-(B)
36 See 19 U.S.C Sec. 2242(a) (1) (A)
37Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright
Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 Syracuse Journal of International and
Comparative Law 39 (1995)
38 See Peter K. Yu, supra note 27, at 142.
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issued new implementing regulations in 1990. 40A separate set of computer
software regulations followed in 1991.41
Notwithstanding these legislative efforts, the United States found intellectual
property protection in China unsatisfactory. On April 26, 1991, the United States
upgraded China to a "Priority Foreign Country." 42 A month later, the United
States initiated a Special 301 investigation on China's intellectual property rights
practices. 43 Hours before the deadline for imposing sanctions, both countries
averted a potential trade war by signing the Memorandum of Understanding
Between China (PRC) and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual
Property ("1992 MOU").44
The 1992 MOU is the most influential agreement on substantial rules protecting
pharmaceutical patent in China. Pursuant to the 1992 MOU, China amended the
1984 Patent Law, promulgated new patent Implementing Regulation, and
acceded to the Patent Cooperation Treaty.  45The new patent law extends the
duration of patent protection from fifteen to twenty years; affords protection to all
chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products;
and sharply restricts the availability of compulsory licenses. 46 The MOU also
establishes the pharmaceutical administrative protection system granting exclusive
rights to foreign pharmaceutical patents granted during the period from 1984 to
1993.47
Though the 1992 MOU was very successful in establishing a modern intellectual
property regime in China, American business still complaint about the lack of
                                                                                                                           
39 The Copyright Law of People’s Republic of China, approved in the 15th Session of the 7th
National Congress on 7th September 1990
<http://www.cnipr.com/copy/coppage/cop_zzqfnew.htm>
40 The Implementing Regulation of the Copyright Law, approved by the Sate Council on 24th
May 1991 <http://www.cnipr.com/copy/coppage/cop_ssxz.htm>
41 The Regulation Protecting Computer Software, promulgated by the State Council on 4th
June 1991, has been replaced by a new version promulgated by the State Council on 1st
January 2002. <http://www.cnipr.com/copy/coppage/cop_bhtl.htm>
42 Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in
Aggressive Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 113.
43 Id
44 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, signed in May 1992,
http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/data/commerce_html/tcc_2/PRCIntellectual_(3).html
(hereinafter “the 1992 MOU”)
45 See Peter K. Yu, supra note 27, at 142.
46 See Article 1, Article 2 of the 1992 MOU, supra note 44; also see Article 25 and Chapter 6
of the 1992 Amendment of Patent Law, supra note 15.
47 See Article 2 of the 1992 MOU, supra note 44; also see the Regulation on Pharmaceutical
Administrative Protection, promulgated by the State Pharmaceutical Administrative Bureau
(hereinafter “SPAB”) on 19th December 1992, in force on 1st January 1993,
http://www.yaoxue.net/law/glp/5-007.htm (hereinafter the Administrative Regulation)
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enforcement mechanism in China. On June 30, 1994, the USTR again designated
China a Priority Foreign Country and immediately initiated a Special 301
investigation.48 Despite threats and counter threats, the two countries reached an
agreement (“1995 Agreement”), 49averting another trade war.
The 1995 Agreement is mainly concerned with the issue of enforcement. Initially,
many commentators considered the 1995 Agreement "the single most
comprehensive and detailed [intellectual property] enforcement agreement the
United States had ever concluded." 50 By November 1995, however, the
Agreement had become apparently inadequate to induce effective intellectual
property protection in China.  On April 30, 1996, the Clinton Administration
again designated China as a Priority Foreign Country for its failure to protect
intellectual property rights. 51 Both countries threatened to impose sanction on
certain categories of goods from the other; a last-minute compromise was
reached for the third time. 52 Unlike the 1992 MOU and the 1995 Agreement,
which spelled out new terms, the 1996 Accord mainly reaffirmed China's
commitment to protect intellectual property rights. This Accord included measures
China had undertaken or would undertake in enforcing intellectual property rights.
53
Although the US now seems to have moved away from unilateral sanctions and
the use of Section 301 investigations, one can hardly predict whether the she will
return to these coercive tactics if domestic politics generate such a need in the
future.54 Nevertheless, if the American government decided to return to such
tactics, it would not be difficult to predict the pattern in which the events would
play out in the next confrontation: threatening from US, compromise made
between US and China and the lack of enforcement of the compromising
agreement. If history has any ability to predict the future, this pattern may very
well suggest how the two countries would behave if the United States continued
its current self-deluding policy.
                                                
48 See Robert E Hudec, supra note 42, at 114
49 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING--1995 ACTION PLAN, signed on 26th February
1995 <http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doit.cgi?204:64:326552087:192> (hereinafter “the
1995 Agreement”)
50 See Robert E Hudec, supra note 42, at 114
51 See Robert E Hudec, supra note 42, at 115
52 Id
53 See PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1995
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AGREEMENT—1996, signed on 16th June 1996
<http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doit.cgi?204:64:326552087:190> (hereinafter “the 1996
Accord”)
54 See Peter K. Yu, supra note 27, at 153
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Taking close look at these interactions, we may find that the evolution of the
Chinese intellectual property protection regime is under constant pressure from
the US. China’s first modern patent law was promoted by the 1979 Agreement.
Specifically, the 1992 MOU forced China to extend its patent subject matters
and establish the administrative protection regime protecting foreign
pharmaceutical patents granted between 1984 and 1993.
As we shall see in 4.2 of this paper, the 1984 Patent Law is very similar to the
Indian 1970 Patent Act, which excluded pharmaceutical products from patentable
subject matters. The Indian 1970 Patent Act had been in force before the TRIPS
came into for India. However, US forced China to amend the 1984 Patent Law
in 1992 to reach the protection level of TRIPS, ten years before TRIPS come
into force for China.
High level of patent protection on the paper has already been achieved in China
as early as in 1992. However, even under the constant pressure of the 1995
Agreement and the 1996 Accord, implementation of patent legislation is still not
satisfactory. To my opinion, the reasons lie in two aspects. First, China is still at
the beginning of its  transformation stage from an agriculture country to an
industrialized country. It has to foster its immature national pharmaceutical
industry to meet the enormous demand of domestic market. The 1984 Patent
Law, just as the 1970 Indian Patent Act, to a large extent fulfilled its role. The
1992 Amendment was too advanced for the current stage of the development of
the national pharmaceutical industry in China at that time. Secondly and in
correlation, there is not enough internal motivation for enforcing thigh-level patent
protection. The 1992 Amendment benefits foreign patent holders much more than
the domestic industry. Two thirds of the invention patents were hold by the
foreign companies in 1992, though Chinese people had filed eleven times more
applications.55 Therefore, there would not be enough lobby power from domestic
industry to promote implementation and enforcement.
2.3 Administrative Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents
The 1992 Amendment of the 1984 Patent Law extended patent protection to
pharmaceuticals and agricultural products. However, during the period between
1984 and 1993, pharmaceuticals were not protected as patents in China. Thus in
accordance with the 1992 MOU, the State Council approved the Regulation on
Administrative Protection of Pharmaceuticals (“the Administrative Regulations”)
on December 12, 1992.56 Eighteen days later the State Pharmaceutical
Administration Bureau of the People’s Republic of China (SPAB) promulgated
the Rules for Implementing the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Administrative
                                                
55 See Peter K Yu, supra note 27 at 206
56 Supra note 47
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Protection (“the rules”)57. A retrospective administrative protection system
protecting foreign pharmaceutical patents was therefore established.
Compared with relevant provisions in the 1992 MOU, the Administrative
Regulation provides protection not only to US pharmaceutical patents, 58 but
Article 5(2) of the Regulation also grants foreign patent holders exclusive
marketing rights. 59Article 3 admits that enterprises, other organizations and
individuals from a country or a region that has concluded a bilateral
pharmaceutical administrative protection agreement with China are able to apply
for administrative protection. 60 Indeed, after the 1992 MOU, China concluded
such bilateral agreements to extend administrative protection to pharmaceutical
and agriculture chemical products patented in the European Community
Countries, Japan and Switzerland. 61
The exclusive marketing rights granted to foreign patent holders include
prohibiting others from making, using or selling the pharmaceutical products in
China, however not including offering for sale and importation, which are normally
included in the exclusive rights of a patent holder. 62The protecting period is seven
years and six months, starting from the issuing date of the certificate for
administrative protection. 63
The substantial requirements for administrative protection in the Administrative
Regulation is the same as in the 1992 MOU. First, the pharmaceuticals must not
be subject to protection under the Chinese Patent Law prior to January 1, 1993.
If it is already a Chinese patent, the Administrative Regulation is not going to offer
overlapping protection. Secondly, the applicant must have already obtained
exclusive right to prohibit others from making, using or selling it in the country to
which the applicant belongs. The exclusive right must have been obtained
between January 1, 1986 and January 1 1993. Thirdly, the pharmaceutical
products shall not have already been marketed in China before the filing date of
administrative protection. 64
The substantive requirements are supplemented by a set of documents that the
applicant must submit. The documents include: foreign patent certificate;
certificate for manufacture or sale in the country that the applicant belongs to; a
contract with a competent Chinese enterprise for manufacturing and/or marketing
the pharmaceutical products in China. Therefore, foreign pharmaceuticals to be
                                                
57 The Rules of Implementing the Regulation on Pharmaceutical Administrative Protection,
promulgated by the SPAB on 30th December 1992, replaced by a new version promulgated
by the SPAB on 24th October 2000 <http://www.nxyj.gov.cn/news/news003.htm>
58 See Article 2 of the 1992 MOU, supra note 44
59 See Article 5(2) of the Administrative Regulation, supra note 47
60 Id Article 3
61 See J. Michel Warner & Han Xiaoqing, supra note 5 at 1177
62 See Article 19 of the Administrative Regulation, supra note 47
63 Id Article 13
64 Id Article 5; See also Article 2 of the 1992 MOU, supra note 44
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protected at least have to be marketed or manufactured in China in cooperation
with a Chinese enterprise. 65In this way, foreign pharmaceutical patent holders are
prevented from taking advantage of administrative protection for the mere
purpose of preventing Chinese domestic industry from producing similar products.
Exclusive right holders may either seek economic compensation in the People’s
court or request the CAPDP to stop the infringement when infringement happens.
66Except for the above-mentioned provision, the regulation provides little clue on
ways for the award of judicial remedies for infringement.  However, the SPAB
has published the new Rules of Administrative Review of the Administrative
Protection of the Pharmaceuticals (“Rules of Review”) on 7 July 2000. 67The
applicants, exclusive right holders or third party may apply for administrative
review when a dispute rises 68Moreover the applicants, exclusive right holders or
a third party may appeal to the State Council or claim to certain People’s Courts
when they do not agree with the result of the review. 69
The administrative protection system resembles the so-called “mailbox system”
provided in article 70. 8 of the TRIPS.70 The mailbox system keeps the priority
date of application and grant exclusive marketing rights to foreign patent holders
in countries that may not be implementing the minimum standards of patent
protection provided by the TRIPS when it enters into force. The mailbox system
restricts its subject matters to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products.71
Similarly, the administrative protection system in China was also trying to
supplement the 1984 patent law, in which pharmaceuticals and agricultural
chemical products are not protected.
It had to be noted that China became a WTO member in 2001 and the TRIPS
shall come into force for China at the end of 2002. However China was forced
by the US to amend its patent legislations as early as in 1992 and establish the
mailbox system to retrospectively protect foreign patents obtained during 1984
and 1993.
In our view, introducing the “mail-box” system into China at such an early time is
harmful to Chinese pharmaceutical industry. First, the administrative protection
only grants exclusive marketing rights to foreign pharmaceutical patent
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holders. Domestic pharmaceutical inventions invented during 1984-1993 are
protected neither by 1984 patent law nor by the administrative protection regime.
The “super national treatment” of foreign pharmaceutical patents eliminated all
incentives for innovation in the national pharmaceutical industry at that time.
Secondly, the administrative protection regime started in 1993 and is still in force
to date. Thus expired or almost expired foreign pharmaceutical patents may
obtain administrative protection in China only because they are foreign patents
that were granted between 1984 and 1993. After 1993, patents are to be granted
to pharmaceuticals due to the 1992 Amendment of the Patent Law. However, the
administrative protection regime prevents all Chinese inventions that are similar to
expired or almost expired foreign patents that has obtained administrative
protection in China from enjoying patent protection. In this regard, the far-
reaching malicious effect of administrative protection may even impede innovation
in Chinese pharmaceutical industry after 1993.
17
3 International Obligations For China
China became a party of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO Convention) in 1980.72 China accessed to the
Paris Convention on 19 March 198573, acceded to the Patent Corporation
Convention in 199474 and acceded to the Convention on Biological Diversity in
1992. China has become a WTO member in 2001 and the TRIPS shall come
into force for China at the end of 2002.
This paper shall focus on substantive international obligations that China bears on
protecting pharmaceutical patents. There are no substantive provisions in the
WIPO Convention. The Patent Corporation Treaty mainly deals with procedures
of international patent application. Thus substantive obligations are mainly
provided in the Paris Convention and the TRIPS.
The Paris Convention mainly deals with three substantive issues in patent
protection, namely, patentability, the right of priority and compulsory license.
Other than national treatment, The Paris Convention has rarely set any minimum
standards in patent protection, not to say specific provisions protecting
pharmaceutical patents.75 Right of priority is a procedural issue and thus will not
be discussed in this paper.
TRIPS has actually incorporated all substantial provisions concerning patent
protection in the Paris Convention.76 Generally speaking, the provisions in TRIPS
(including Paris Convention) concerning objectives and principles, patentability
(including subject matters), exclusive rights granted to the patent holders and
exceptions to exclusive rights are relevant to pharmaceutical patents. These
provisions do not only frequently appear in the different views submitted
separately by developing and developed country groups in the forum of WTO,
but are also confirmed in the WTO fact sheets on the pharmaceutical patent and
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public health. 77The Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
(Doha Declaration) further clarified many of the above-mentioned issues. 78For
the purpose of presentation in this paper, relevant provisions are divided into four
groups: (1) objectives and purposes of the TRIPS; (2) subject matters and
patentability; (3) compulsory license and (4) parallel importation.
3.1 Objectives and Principles
Objectives and principles have their far-reaching effect in the TRIPS. The Doha
Declaration confirms that “in applying the customary rules of interpretation of
public international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in
the light of the objective and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in
particular, in its objectives and principles”. 79
Reading all the provisions in the light of the objectives and principles is also
common practice of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in interpreting the
TRIPS. The WTO Appellate Body (AB) articulated principles for interpret ting
TRIPS in the India - Patented Pharmaceuticals (Mailbox) Case. 80 The AB
indicated that the rules of treaty interpretation outlined in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties apply, and that panels and the AB would
begin by examining the express terms of the TRIPS, giving them their ordinary
meaning in their context, and in light of the object and purpose of the agreement.
81 In the Vienna Convention, reference to negotiating history is only used to
confirm results derived from analysis of the express text or to aid when express
text renders ambiguous meaning. 82The central point of the AB's decision was that
the "legitimate expectations" of Members and private patent holders in Members
is not the basis for interpreting the Agreement. 83What the pharmaceutical sector
in the United States and Europe hoped or expected to achieve is not necessary to
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be considered by the treaty interpreter. 84 The meaning of the TRIPS is to be
derived from the language agreed upon by the Members.
Though TRIPS confirms that intellectual property rights are private rights, 85 the
objectives of the TRIPS are not simply protecting private rights. Moreover,
TRIPS states its commitment to “…the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”. 86Bearing the mutual
advantage and the social and economic welfare in mind, TRIPS further permits
the member states “…in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, to
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the
provisions of this agreement”. 87 In achieving the balance of rights and obligations,
“appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of
this agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights
by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or
adversely affect the international transfer of technology”.88
The objectives and principles have other corresponding provisions in the TRIPS.
These so-called flexibility provisions are crucial in implementing TRIPS in
developing countries. 89 Inventions maybe excluded from patentable subject
matters on the basis of social and economic welfare consideration. 90Also,
exceptions to exclusive rights of the patent holders are acceptable provided that
they are in conformity with other requirements in the TRIPS.91 Exceptions to
exclusive rights may originate from either social and economic welfare
consideration or balancing rights and obligation. The principle of addressing
abusing of rights most typically reflected in the anti-competition provision, where
“nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their
legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute
an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in
the relevant market”. 92
The Doha Declaration confirms using these flexibility provisions in addressing
public health crisis. It reaffirms “the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.” 93
It agrees that “TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
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commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members'
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all.”
3.2 Subject matters and Patentability
When the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations for the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was launched, more than fifty countries, including some
developing countries, did not confer patent protection on pharmaceuticals.
94While some regarded this absence of protection as necessary to promote
access to drugs at competitive prices, 95 others criticized it as jeopardizing
innovation and unfairly depriving inventors of the benefits generated by their
contributions. 96
Article 27.1 of TRIPS obliges all WTO members to recognize patents in all fields
of technology. 97 When in force, the provision shall make direct and permanent
excluding pharmaceuticals out of patentable subject matters unacceptable under
TRIPS.
On the other hand, two provisions in TRIPS justify excluding pharmaceuticals
from patentable subject matters in limited circumstances. The first exception is
ordre public and other paramount social values, which are the recognized
grounds for exceptions from patentability under article 27.2. There is no
universally accepted notion of ordre public, 98 leaving member countries some
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flexibility to define which situations are covered, depending upon their own social
and cultural values. Article 27.2 somehow indicates that the concept is not limited
to "security" issues; it also relates to the protection of "human, animal or plant life
or health" and may be applied to inventions that may lead to "serious prejudice to
the environment." Moreover, Article 27.2 provides that non-patentability on
grounds of ordre public or other paramount social value are only permissible if
necessary to prevent commercial exploitation of the invention concerned. In
other words, it is not possible to declare the non-patentability of a certain subject
matter while permitting at the same time its distribution or sale by any third
party.99
A second exception that might authorize excluding pharmaceuticals from
patentability is article 8.1, which explicitly recognizes the right of WTO members
to adopt policies in accordance with public health concerns. However, measures
in Article 8.1 appears to be public policy measures, which are out of the regime
of intellectual property law. Moreover, the adopted policies are subject to a test
of "necessity" and a test of consistency. 100 “Consistency” requires that the policy
measures are consistent with other provisions of the TRIPS.  Since
pharmaceuticals are required to be patentable subject matters in the TRIPS,
101exclusion of pharmaceuticals from patentable subject matters under Article 8.1
could not be permanent. 102 Exclusions to relieve specific public health
emergencies, especially if limited in time, might be justifiable under Article 8.1 if
they are a necessary part of an overall strategy for addressing the emergency.
A key consideration we should notice is the purpose for which any subject matter
exclusion is adopted. If, for example, the same objective could be obtained by
imposing permissible compulsory licenses under article 31 of TRIPS, an exclusion
of patentability could be viewed as merely an attempt to circumvent the
comprehensive procedural preconditions of article 31.103 However, if local
situations are serious enough to justify an ordre public exception, then these
situations might also justify overriding other articles, such as article 31, in favor of
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some nonpermanent exclusion of subject matter under Article 27.2, if that
exclusion was necessary to addressing the local situation.104
Besides the two exceptions, TRIPS explicitly allows member states exclude
certain inventions from patentability, most of which are relevant to pharmaceutical
industry: (1) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods; (2) plants and animals
other than micro-organisms. 105
In conclusion, excluding all pharmaceuticals from patentable subject matters is not
permitted by the TRIPS. However, in limited circumstances, certain
pharmaceuticals maybe excluded from patentable subject matters.
3.3 Compulsory License
Article 30 of TRIPS allows member states to enact limited compulsory licenses
"provided that such [licenses] do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of third
parties." 106 The TRIPS drafters neglected to define key terms in Article 30 such
as "unreasonably conflicting," "normal exploitation," and "legitimate interests."
Article 31 of TRIPS imposes certain procedural conditions on compulsory license
grants. These conditions include: (1) the third party must accept the license on
reasonable commercial terms; (2) the license is nonexclusive; (3) the license is
non-assignable; (4) the license is authorized predominantly to supply the domestic
market; (5) the license is limited to authorized uses; (6) the license may terminate
if reason for the grant ceases to exist; (7) adequate remuneration is required and
is subject to judicial review; (8) the issuance of a compulsory license is itself
subject to judicial review. 107
Under Article 31, member states may license to work a patent dependant on a
prior patent. The dependent patent must "involve an important technical advance
of considerable economic significance in relation" to the first patent. The patentee
of the first patent is entitled to cross-license the second patentee's invention on
reasonable terms. Upon licensing the use of the first patent, the second patentee
may not assign the right to use the first patent to a third party. 108
The Doha Declaration has explicitly included public health crisis into the national
emergency (or other extreme emergency) that maybe dealt with by the Article 31
(b) of TRIPS. 109 Thus addressing public health crisis could either be a unique
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ground of granting compulsory license in Article 8.1 or be included in the ground
of emergency in Article 31 (b). In the case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme emergency or in case of public non-commercial use, the
condition of “reasonable commercial terms” maybe waived, provided that the
patent holder shall be informed promptly. 110
Article 31 of the TRIPS does not limit the number or type of grounds upon which
WTO Members may grant compulsory licenses. It states: "Where the law of a
Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties
authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected . . ." 111
Moreover, article 40 of the TRIPS allows member states to take measures
dealing with anti-competition practices in relation to abusing intellectual property
rights. It states that “ nothing in this Agreement shall prevent members from
specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular
cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect
on competition in the relevant market.” Also, “ a member may adopt, consistently
with the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or
control such practices…” Thus compulsory license may be used as effective
measures dealing with anti-competition practices of intellectual property holders.
Compulsory license on the ground of correcting anti-competition practice need
not to be restricted by (b) and (f) of Article 31, namely, the conditions of
“reasonable commercial terms” and “predominantly supply the domestic
market”.112
Article 2.1 of the TRIPS provides: "In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this
Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 - 12, and Article 19, of the
Paris Convention (1967)." 113 Article 5.A.2 of the Paris Convention provides:
"Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for
example, failure to work." 114 The condition for compulsory license provided by
the Paris Convention is that such measures should be taken to "prevent the abuses
which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent
. . .." 115 This requirement has been interpreted liberally by governments, including
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the U.S. government, in authorizing and granting compulsory licenses in a wide
variety of contexts.116
Moreover, the Paris Convention provides that compulsory license granted on the
basis of failure to work or non-sufficient work shall only be granted four years
after the application date of the patent or three years after the granting of the
patent, whichever date is later. 117
In the Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Generic
Pharmaceuticals) report, the WTO panel indicated that WTO Members agree
that Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement is subject to Article 27.1 of the
Agreement. 118This means that compulsory licenses are subject to the requirement
that: "patent rights [shall be] enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced." 119
Pharmaceutical producers have argued that Article 27.1 prohibits WTO
Members from adopting compulsory licensing legislation that is specifically
directed at the pharmaceutical sector and is not generally applicable to other
sectors. The panel report in the Canada - Generic Pharmaceuticals Case rejected
this line of analysis. Although Article 27.1 of the TRIPS may preclude some forms
of differentiation among fields of patented inventions, it certainly does not
preclude all differentiation. It prohibits only differentiation that is "discriminatory."
120 The panel in the Canada - Generic Pharmaceuticals Case suggested that the
term "discrimination" in TRIPS Article 27.1 should be read flexibly. The panel
said: "Article 27 prohibits only discrimination as to the place of invention, the field
of technology, and whether products are imported or produced locally. Article 27
does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may exist only
in certain product areas." 121 The panel confirms that governments are permitted
to adopt different rules for particular product areas, provided that the differences
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are adopted for bona fide purposes. 122 The panel did not attempt to provide a
general rule regarding what differences will be considered bona fide.123
It is obvious that the factors that will support granting compulsory licenses in the
field of pharmaceuticals will not be the same as the factors that support granting
compulsory licenses in, for example, the field of machine tools or Internet
auctions. Differentiation maybe justified. Also the TRIPS expressly provides that
Members may adopt necessary measures consistent with other provisions to
address public health emergencies.124The creation of a system for rapid low-
priced access to pharmaceuticals would be a logical and foreseeable mechanism
for addressing public health emergencies. In drafting legislation to provide for such
access, a government would not be expected to similarly address access to
patents for automobile parts, nuclear reactor components and Internet auction
software. Different domestic regulatory authorities would be involved. In the
pharmaceuticals case, public health authorities are most likely to be involved in
reviewing the grounds for granting compulsory license. In other fields of
technology, this will not be the case.
In sum, the language of the TRIPS permitting WTO Members to grant
compulsory licenses is not ambiguous. The Doha Declaration further confirms that
member states have the right to grant compulsory license. 125The grounds of
granting compulsory license are unlimited, though they have to be subjected to the
procedural restriction in TRIPS. There is no doubt that a WTO Member facing a
public health crisis, and determining that a pharmaceutical product is not available
at prices sufficiently low to allow that emergency to be addressed in the public
interest, may grant a compulsory license to a party other than the patent holder to
produce the drug. According to the opinion of the DSB in the Canada-Generic
Pharmaceuticals case, grounds for granting compulsory license on pharmaceutical
patents may not be considered as discriminative under TRIPS 27.1 if
differentiation in these grounds is for bona fide purpose.
3.4 Parallel importation
The TRIPS provides in Article 6: "For the purposes of dispute settlement under
this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4, nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights." 126 The express text states that nothing in the TRIPS may be
used to address the exhaustion question in dispute settlement. Most
commentators agree that this formula represents an agreement to disagree among
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WTO Members on the subject of parallel trade, leaving each Member free to
adopt its own policy and rules.127
However, Several influential authorities contend that overuse of the exhaustion
doctrine would conflict with the exclusive right of importation conferred by article
28(a) of TRIPS and with the restriction of article 27(1) of TRIPS, which forbids
discrimination "as to . . . whether products are imported or locally produced." 128
Parallel importation also has the possibility of conflicting with Article 30, which
provides that exceptions for exclusive rights should not “unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent holder”.
Article 28 of the TRIPS provides: 1. A patent shall confer on its owner the
following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to
prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making,
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing (See footnote 6) for these purposes
that product; [Footnote 6: This right, like all other rights conferred under this
Agreement in respect of the use, sale, importation or other distribution of goods,
is subject to the provisions of Article 6.] 129By its express terms, Article 28 gives
patent holders the right to consent to the importation of products into countries
where they hold patent rights. This means that patent holders may use their patent
rights to prevent infringement by importation. The express language of Article 28
does not address the question of exhaustion, and is specifically cross-referenced
to Article 6.
Whether a patent holder in a country must consent to the importation of a
potentially infringing product is directly dependent on whether its patent right in
that country has previously been exhausted. If in the national legislation, exclusive
rights have already been “exhausted” when patented products have been for the
first time put in the market of a foreign country, the patent holder no longer has
the right to consent to importation. This is what “exhaustion” exactly means, and it
is a question that has customarily been reserved to the national law of each state
(or to a regional organization). It is a question that Article 28 does not purport to
answer. 130 On the other hand, under Article 28 of the TRIPS, patent holders
have the right to prevent unauthorized importation of their products that are
placed on the market of the foreign country without their consent.131 Article
28 specifically prohibits importing pirated patented products. 132
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Article 6 makes it very clear that nothing in the TRIPS shall be used to address
exhaustion in dispute settlement, including Article 27(1) and Article 30. Even if
we remove the context of dispute settlement, parallel importation is not in conflict
with Article 27(1) and Article 30. When parallel importation happens, the
exclusive rights in the imported products have already been exhausted after the
products are put on a foreign market. So, there could not be discrimination in
enjoying patent rights, as prohibited by the Article 27 (1), or unreasonable
prejudice of the interests of the patent holder, as prohibited by Article 30, since
the patent holder no longer holds the exclusive rights to consent to importation.
A number of countries, including the United States, allow the parallel importation
of products that are protected by local patents.133There is wide consensus among
trade and intellectual property experts that the TRIPS allows WTO Members to
adopt the exhaustion policy best suited to them at the present time.134 The Doha
Declaration further confirms that the TRIPS intends to “ leave each Member free
to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the
MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.”135
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4 Models for Comparison: South Africa
and India
China has a nascent national pharmaceutical industry. During the years 1996,
1997 and 1998, in the field of chemical pharmaceutical products, there were
3572 foreign patent applications while domestic applications were only 990. In
the field of biotechnological pharmaceutical products, there were 886 foreign
patent applications while there were only 332 domestic applications. 136On the
other hand, the number of HIV bearers increased 30% from 2000 to 2001,
according to the official statistics. 137
Fostering national pharmaceutical industry and dealing with possible public health
crisis are the main concern of developing countries in the debate over TRIPS and
public health. These two missions are apparently connected with each other. 138
As we may have concluded from the legislation history analysed above, China has
been easily compromised under the pressure of the US and has not adequately
considered the demands of the domestic pharmaceutical industry. Also the
increasing public health pressure and the insufficient health insurance system urge
China to find solutions in domestic patent legislations and administrative law that is
out of the intellectual property legal system.
South Africa has provided a very good model in enacting administrative legislation
out of the patent legislation regime. It has enacted a new law to allow the ministry
of health to grant compulsory license and authorize parallel importation. India, on
the other hand, provides a very good example on national patent legislation,
especially these legislations concerning subject matters and compulsory license.
The 1970 Indian Patent Act sufficiently fosters the development of the national
pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, India has struggled hard with the US in the
mailbox case and has won priceless time for the development of the domestic
pharmaceutical industry.
4.1 South Africa
With a population of roughly 26 million people, South Africa is also home of
approximately three million reported cases of HIV/AIDS. 139With 1,500 new
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cases emerging every day, by the year 2005, almost 20% of the workforce is
predicted to be infected with the virus.140
4.1.1 MRSCAA
In December of 1997 the Prime Minister of South Africa signed the Medicines
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act (MRSCAA). 141The Act
addresses South Africa's AIDS pandemic by providing a mechanism through
which antiretroviral agents could be made cheaper and more available to South
Africa's poor and HIV infected. 142In particular, the Act contains language
granting the South African Minister of Health the power to engage in compulsory
licensing and parallel importation of pharmaceuticals. Section 15 (C) (a) provides
the Minister of Health with the power to permit the compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals, so long as the product was initially marketed by the owner or
with the owner's consent, but without any other expressed limitation. 143In
addition, section 15 c (b) allows the Minister to permit parallel importation of
drugs.144 It should be noted that the language of the Act is general, allowing the
Health Minister to use the Act to increase the availability of any pharmaceuticals
used to address any situation, so long as basic criteria are met. 145
Section 15 (c) (a) and (b) are aimed at increasing local price competition and
lowering prices by allowing the importation of drugs from other countries where
they are cheaper.146 It has also been suggested that this section gives South Africa
leverage to force the industry to lower their prices.147 The minister of health can
                                                
140 Id; see also Matthew Kramer, The Bolar Amendment Abroad: Preserving the Integrity
of American Patent Overseas after the South African Medicine Act, Dickinson Journal of
International Law 565
(Spring 2000)
141 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No. 90 (1997) (S. Afr.).
(hereinafter MRSCAA)
142 Duane Nash, South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substance Control and Amendment
Act of 1997,  Berkeley Technology Law Journal 491 (2000)
143 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No. 90, § 10(a) (1997) (S.
Afr.)
144 Id
145 Id
146 See James Love, Comments of the Consumer Project on Technology to the Portfolio
Committee on Health Parliament (visited Oct. 14, 1998) <http:// www
.cptech.or/pharm/sa/sa-10-97.html>.
147 David Benjamin Snyder, South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substance Control and
Amendment Act: a Spoonful of Sugar or a Bitter Pill to Swallow? Dickinson Journal of
International Law 186
(1999)
30
threaten to begin parallel importation of a manufacturer's drugs from other
countries if the local prices do not conform to rates abroad.148
4.1.2 Debate over the MRSCAA
The Act quickly provoked severe criticism from western governments and
pharmaceutical interests, who represent the majority of antiretroviral
manufacturers. 149 The USTR, in particular, alleged that the Act potentially
violated TRIPS, and threatened sanctions in response to the decreased revenue
that the Act would cause American pharmaceutical interests. 150Moreover, the
forty-two members of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South
Africa, composed significantly of local licensees of western pharmaceutical firms,
quickly challenged the Act's legality in Pretoria High Court.151
In defending the new law, South African Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin
stated "the government had taken a policy decision to stop drug companies from
using their patents to prevent affordable health care." While this is surely the case,
the extent to which the law infringes on patent rights is unclear. Upon closer
examination, the law does not appear to give the Minister of Health the absolute
power to abrogate patent rights, but instead the law seems to simply give her the
power to authorize parallel importation and compulsory license.152
The United States and South Africa suggest a truce between the Act's supporters
and its critics. Specifically, on September 9, 1999, the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of South Africa announced that it would suspend
litigation over the Act as a "goodwill gesture" while the Minister of Health
considers legislative amendments that will make compliance with TRIPS
unambiguous. 153 In response, the Minister of Health agreed to redraft the Act the
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following year. 154 Eight days later, the USTR announced that the United States
and South Africa had resolved their differences. The United States promised to
drop threats of trade sanctions against South Africa. 155In return, South Africa
agreed to enforce the Act's compulsory licensing and parallel importation
provisions in compliance with TRIPS.
Since South Africa is a developing country, the TRIPS came into force for South
Africa in 2000. 156As I have already analyzed in the 3.4 of this paper, parallel
importation established by the Section 15 (C) (b) is consistent with the TRIPS,
especially when the Doha Declaration confirms that each member may be free to
adopt its own regime of exhaustion. 157As for the compulsory license system
established under Section 15 (C) (a), though the wording of the provision seems
to be so broad that may endanger all exclusive rights held by the pharmaceutical
patent holders, the South Africa government finally has agreed to enforce the
compulsory licensing in compliance with TRIPS. If Section 15 (C) (a) is
subjected to the procedural conditions of Article 31 of the TRIPS and the three-
step test in the Article 30, this provision could not be an unreasonable
infringement of the exclusive rights of the patent holders. 158 In the developing
countries’ paper submitted to the discussion on the TRIPS and public health, the
practice of South Africa has been viewed as a great success and a good example
for domestic legislation dealing with public health crisis. 159
4.2 India
The India 1970 Patent Act explicitly excludes food and medicine from the subject
matters of product patent. Also this Act grants the central government the
authority to grant compulsory license if the patent holder “could not meet the
reasonable requirement of the general public. “ Though in 1994 India admits that
pharmaceutical and food may be patentable, the exclusive marketing rights
guaranteed by the “mail-box” system is not to be granted to foreign
pharmaceutical patents until 2005.
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The rationale behind this legislation is that most pharmaceutical patents in India
are foreign patents. India’s use of 1970 Act fosters a strong and profitable
domestic generic drug industry, which not only could fulfil the “reasonable”
requirements of the general public, but also contributes to its national economic.
India has also been under the pressure from the US. US brought India to the
WTO DSB in the well-known “mail box” case because India refused to adopt a
“mail-box” system before the substantial amendment of the 1970 Patent Act
came into force in accordance with TRIPS. India struggled very hard from 1996
to 1999 even though the AB ruled in favour of the US. The Indian government
brought into force special measures equal to the “mail box” system as late as in
1999.
4.2.1  Patentable Subject Matters
Section 48 (2) of the 1970 Indian Patent Act provides two types of patents:
process patents--a patent for a method or process of manufacturing an article or
substance whereby the patentee gains the "exclusive right ... to use or exercise the
method or process in India"; product patents--a patent for an article or substance
whereby the patentee gains the "exclusive right ... to make, use, exercise, sell or
distribute such articles or substance in India".
Section 5 provides that, in relation to certain categories of inventions, only
process patents are available. Product patents are not available for inventions: (a)
claiming substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or
medicine or drug; or (b) relating to substances prepared or produced by chemical
process (including alloys, optical glass, semi conductors and inter-metallic
compounds). Medicine and drugs are defined very widely in section 2 (1). 160
It is therefore not possible to gain product patents in relation to good, medicine
and drugs. This has caused the greatest amount of controversy at an international
level.  By comparison with the level of protection in developed countries,
pharmaceutical patents are vastly under protected in India.
4.2.2 Compulsory License, Licensing and Revocation of
Rights
The patentee has a three-year grace period from obtaining of the patent before a
compulsory license can be granted. After this any person can apply for a
compulsory license where:  "the reasonable requirements of the public with
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respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied or [where] the patented
invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price...” 161
The Central government may make an application under section 86 (1) that a
patent be endorsed with a license of right. These are also determined according to
the "reasonable requirements" criteria. Process patents for inventions relating to
food, medicine, drugs or chemical processes are automatically endorsed with
licenses of right three years after they are granted. 162Once an invention has been
endorsed with a license of right, any person may request that they be granted a
license to exploit it. They need not to show that the patentee has failed to make
full use of the patent or is unable to work the invention effectively.
The Central government may apply to the Controller to revoke a patent if it feels
that the reasonable requirements of the public have not been met or the invention
is not available at a reasonable price. This may occur only after two years have
passed from the date a compulsory license or license of right was granted. In
determining whether to revoke a patent, whether the patentee has failed to
develop the related industry in India is relevant. 163 The Central government may
also revoke a patent if "the mode of its exercise is mischievous to the state or
generally prejudicial to the public."164
Notably, a patent owner may be subject to a license or revocation if it fails to
work the invention in India or where demand for the invention is substantially
being met by importation. Further, importation does not qualify as working the
patent under the Act. 165This limits the ability of a foreign patent owner to obtain a
patent for the mere purpose of preventing importation by competitors or
preventing local production. The invention must be worked in India and Indian
demand must be substantially met by local production to avoid failing to meet the
"reasonable requirements" criteria.
4.2.3 Underline Rationale of the 1970 Indian Patent Act
Essentially, the Patents Act 1970 focuses on the public interest rather than on the
protection of private property interests. Its underlying philosophy is expressed in
section 83 which states: ... patents are granted to encourage inventions and to
ensure that the inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the
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fullest extent that is reasonably practicable without undue delay ... they are not
granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the
patented article. 166
From the 1970 Indian patent Act, we find that Indian government grants exclusive
rights to exploit an invention on a quid pro quo basis. In return for exclusive rights
the patent owner works the invention in India leading to the establishment of a
new industry, increased employment and capital. The patent owner must also
disclose the invention so that the public can work it once the patent has expired.
Patent law revolves around this bargain--exclusive rights in exchange for
knowledge and input into the local economy. The Patents Act 1970 substantially
limits the range of patentable inventions and lists numerous categories of
inventions that are not patentable. Although the Act provides certain protection of
the rights of patent owners, it also provides the government with substantial
powers to restrict those rights.167
4.2.4 The US-Indian Mailbox Case
India is a WTO member since 1994. As a developing country, the TRIPS came
into force for India in 2000. 168On December 31, 1994, the President of India
promulgated the 1994 Patents Ordinance (1994 Amendment) to amend the 1970
Patents Act of India and increase patent protection. 169The 1994 Amendment
stipulated that applications claiming patent protection for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical product inventions would be accepted. However, the 1994
Amendment also declared that such accepted patents were not patentable yet,
that their handling would be deferred until January 1, 2005 or until an application
for the grant of an exclusive marketing right for the patent in question occurred.
170The 1994 Amendment lapsed on March 26, 1995 when Parliament failed to
take the matter up within the deadline. 171In March of 1995, the Lower House of
the Indian Parliament passed a 1995 Patents [Amendment] Bill (1995 Bill)
intended to give permanent legislative effect to the provisions of the 1994
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Amendment, 172however, lapsed in May 1995 because the Upper house refused
to pass it. 173
In response, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) named
India on its list of priority watch countries on May 1, 1996. 174On July 8, 1996
the USTR opened a formal investigation to review India's alleged failure to
provide patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products,
as required under the TRIPS Agreement. 175The United States presented its first
submission to a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel (Panel) on March 6, 1997, 176
The United States alleged violations of Articles 70(8) ("mailbox" system) and
70(9) (exclusive marketing rights) of the TRIPS. 177
On September 5, 1997, the panel concluded that India failed to comply with its
obligations under Article 70(8)(a), and, in the alternative, paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article 63 of the TRIPS. 178 India failed to establish a mechanism that adequately
preserves novelty and priority for product patents for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical inventions, as required by Article 70(8) of the TRIPS. 179
Further, the Panel concluded that India did not comply with its obligations under
Article 70(9) of the TRIPS in failing to establish a system for the grant of
exclusive marketing rights. 180
On October 16, 1997, India notified the WTO of its decision to appeal the
Panel's findings and conclusions.181 India requested the Appellate Body to review
the Panel's findings and conclusions regarding Articles 70(8) and 70(9), as well as
Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement, regarding the transparency of relevant
legislations. 182India's strongest argument centered on Articles 70(9) and 63.
Article 70(9) grants exclusive marketing rights to the patentee. In this case, Article
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70(9) required that (1) a "mailbox" application be filed in India; (2) a patent
application be filed and approved in another Member country, after January 1,
1995; (3) another Member country approves the marketing of the product; and
(4) India approves the marketing of the product. 183 The Panel determined India
had not denied the grant of exclusive marketing rights to applicants who had met
the above conditions. 184 However, the Panel determined that India did not
comply with Article 70(9) due to its' failure to implement any system for the grant
of exclusive marketing rights. 185 India responded in their Notification of Appeal
that Article 70(9) of the TRIPS Agreement does not require the establishment of
such a system. 186
On December 19, 1997, the Appellate Body issued its report. 187 The Appellate
Body upheld the findings and conclusions of the Panel regarding Articles 70(8)
and 70(9), but reversed the Panel's conclusion regarding paragraph 1 and 2 of
Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement. 188While the Article 63 decision was
overturned, the bulk of the findings against India were upheld. In August of 1998,
a WTO dispute panel reaffirmed that India violated WTO rules by not
implementing a "mailbox" system for the reception of patents for pharmaceuticals.
189 The determination of an implementation date was the only issue that remained.
While India believed a June 16, 1999 deadline was reasonable, the United States
saw no reason for further delay. 190 The parties eventually agreed to a deadline
date of April 19, 1999. Another 1998 Amendment was passed by both Houses
of the Parliament on March 26, 1999. 191With this passage, India fully complied
with the recommendation of the DSB. 192
From the US-India mailbox case, we see the benefits of refusing introducing the
“mail-box” system. Even after India has been a WTO member in 1995, it has
struggled four years in the mailbox case to resist granting exclusive marketing
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rights to foreign pharmaceuticals. The mailbox system came into force in India in
February 1999. Four-year struggle is very important to domestic pharmaceutical
industry, since domestic industry may patent their similar pharmaceutical products
during the time. Therefore, even though the mailbox system was introduced in
1999, similar foreign pharmaceutical patents could not obtain exclusive marketing
rights at that time because of the existence of similar domestic patents.
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5 Re-Evaluation of Current Chinese
Patent Legislation
The consistency of the current Chinese patent legislation with TRIPS (including
the Paris Convention) shall be evaluated. Suggestions in favor of domestic
pharmaceutical industry and better legislative measures dealing with public health
crisis shall be proposed. When necessary, Chinese patent legislation shall be
compared with the Indian 1970 Patent Act and MRSCAA of South Africa,
bearing in mind that the Indian 1970 Patent Act has fostered competent domestic
pharmaceutical industry and the South African MRSCAA grants significant power
to the ministry of health to deal with the HIV/AIDS crisis.
5.1 Patentable Subject Matters
As explained in the 2.1 and 2.2 of this paper, the 1992 Amendment had added
pharmaceutical products and agriculture products into the patentable subject
matters. Moreover, the administrative protection regime started to protect foreign
pharmaceutical patents granted during 1984 and 1993 since 1 January 1993.
Thus currently, Chinese patent legislation is consistent with the non-discrimination
requirement provided in the Article 27.1 of the TRIPS. 193
 Article 27. 2 of the TRIPS allows member states to exclude certain inventions
from patentable subject matters, based on consideration of ordre public, morality
or environment. 194 Correspondently Chinese patent legislation excludes
inventions that are illegal under national legislations, inventions that are in conflict
with public morality and inventions that are in conflict with public interests
(including inventions that are dangerous to the environment) from patentable
subject matters. 195
Inventions that can be patentable subject matters are infinite. I shall discuss the
patentable subject matters from a functional perspective, dividing them into
products, substances existing in nature, uses and methods of diagnosis. Claims
and disclosure are issues closely relating to subject matters in the process of
patent application. Thus
both two issues shall be included in this part as well.
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5.1.1 Products
Chinese patent law protects inventions, utility models and industrial designs. 196
The Implementing Regulation of the 1992 Amendment provides that products
maybe protected as inventions, utility models or industrial designs. 197 The
patentability requirements and the duration of protection are different among the
three different protection form.   In practice, product patents are the essential part
of all patents ever granted.
In the 1984 Patent Law, chemical substances and pharmaceutical products were
excluded from patentable subject matters. 198Similarly, Indian 1970 Patent Act
did not protect pharmaceutical products and food as product patent. Only the
way of manufacturing or utilizing pharmaceuticals and food may be protected as
process patent.199 Since the 1992 Amendment, pharmaceutical products are
patentable in China. 200In the Administrative protection regime, foreign
pharmaceutical product patent holders are granted exclusive marketing rights in
China.201
In the pharmaceutical field, chemical compounds, the active component of the
pharmaceutical products, are patentable as product patents in China.  Once the
product patent is granted to the pharmaceutical compound, it enjoys so-called
“absolute protection”. The patent holder has the exclusive rights of manufacturing,
using, selling and importing the patented chemical compound. 202
Pharmaceutical composition, mixture consisted of active chemical ingredients,
carrier and adjuvant, may be patented as product patent in China as well.
However the protection scope shall be limited by the use of the composition.
Using the composition on disease other than these diseases that have been
claimed in the patent is not infringement of the patent. The issue of claim shall be
analyzed in 5.1.5.
Excluding all pharmaceuticals from patentable subject matters is not permissible
under TRIPS.203 However, TRIPS will come into force for China at the end of
2002. Unlike India, China grants patents to pharmaceutical products since 1993.
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204Moreover, foreign pharmaceutical patents granted during 1984 and 1993 are
protected under the administrative protection regime. 205 Considering that
pharmaceutical products are essential to the public health situation in China and
most of the pharmaceutical patents are held by foreigners, it seems we are too
easy to compromise with the pressure from the US.206
5.1.2 Substances Existing in Nature
Some pharmaceutical products are or consist of natural substances. Plants, in
particular, are indispensable source of medicines. 207 Animals, especially mice, are
always used as experimental tools in pharmaceutical research. TRIPS allow
member states to exclude plants and animals from patentable subject matters.
However, It obliges member states to protect micro-organisms and plant varieties
under either patent system or a sui generis system. 208
National laws vary considerably when deciding whether natural substances are
patentable. In US, an isolated or purified form of a natural product, including
genes, is patentable. 209Also, US has granted patents to plants and animals,
provided that they are biologically altered in some way. The European Directive
on Biotechnological Inventions210 adopts a similar approach. The Directive,
essentially a declaration of long standing law throughout much of Europe,
establishes that "biological material" and substances isolated from nature, including
new antibiotics and genes, will be considered patentable. 211 On the other hand,
European Patent Office (EPO) explicitly excluded plant and animal varieties
out of the regime of the patentable subject matters. In the case law of EPO, it has
defined the “varieties” in a very narrow way, as narrow as generic in the sense of
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Biology, so as to grant patent to a kind of genetically altered mouse in the
Harvard Onco-Mouse case. 212
Generally, natural substances are patentable in China, provided that not only its
natural existence has been discovered, but also it is isolated from the natural
world for the first time, and it must have industrial value.213 However, situations
are different when considering different kind of natural substances.
Plants and animals varieties are explicitly excluded from patentable subject
matters in China. 214 though the definition of plant variety is far from clear in the
international level. Consistent with the TRIPS, China has a sui genesis system
protecting the plant varieties, though not very efficient.
Plants and animals are different from plant and animal varieties. Chinese patent
legislation keeps silent on whether plants and animals are patentable. Therefore,
plants and animals may directly be subject to the patentability test. In the practice
of the SPB, only cells of plants and animals have ever been granted patents.
Other tissues, such as organs of plant and animals as well as plant and animals
themselves have never been patented in China. 215
Genes have been patented in China since 1993, provided that they have
distinguishable functions and the functions have been detected.  The Guideline has
been amended in 2000 to included genes as patentable subject matter. 216 In
China, legislators think that as a country that is wealthy in the resources of genes,
China had better grant patents to genes.217
In practice, the SPO thinks that micro-organisms are neither plant or animals.
218Thus micro-organisms could not be plant varieties that have been excluded
from patentable subject matters. So, Micro-organisms are patentable in China. 219
Countries with scarce local research capabilities and countries prioritizing
medicine affordability and access may prefer limiting the patentability of
substances existing in nature.220 China prefers to prioritize the affordability of
medicine. On the other hand, China has great potential in biological research and
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biological resources. Among natural substances, China grants patent to cells,
genes and micro-organisms. Compared with the EPO and the US, China holds
more cautious and restricted attitude towards patenting natural substances, yet
China has not excluded all natural substances from patentable subject matters.
The practice is consistent with the research capacity of China. We suggest that
China should proceed cautiously and keep noticing the practice in the US and
Europe.
5.1.3 Uses
New chemical substances are hardly found.  Most pharmaceutical patents are
granted to processes of manufacture, formulations, systems of delivery, and new
uses of a known product. 221
When a new therapeutic use is found for a known product, which had no
previous pharmaceutical use, it is normally called the “first indication”. In Europe,
under article 54(5) of the European Patent Convention, the identification of the
first medical indication of a known product may suffice to obtain a product patent
for the product. 222 The US, by contrast, has adopted a stricter approach,
confining patents on uses of known product to a particular "method- of-use"
patent. Such method-of-use patents only protect the method of using the product;
however do not protect the product itself. 223
In some cases, a new use is discovered for a known product that already has
existing pharmaceutical use. It is called the “second indication” of a known
product. The European Patent Office (EPO) began to grant “method-of-use”
patent to the “second indication” since 1984 provided that the “second indication”
is claimed in the “Swiss Formula”. The Swiss formula is the "use of X for the
manufacture of a medicine to treat Y."224
In China, a known product could not be granted product patent anymore since
the product itself has already lost novelty. Thus neither the “ first indication” nor
the “second indication” of the known product can render a known product to be
patented as product again. 225However, the same as the US patent practice, a
“method of use” patent may be granted to the “first indication” or the “second
indication” of a known product.
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 In the practice of SPO, the claim “use x as a certain medicine to treat disease y”
is not acceptable since the claim shall be deemed as therapeutic method, which is
not patentable in China226. The SPO accepts the claim such as “ use x to produce
a medicine to treat disease y” or “ the use of x in producing medicine to treat
disease y”. The claim accepted by the SPO is exactly the same as the “Swiss
Formula” accepted by the EPO.227
There is no specific requirement on the use patent, no matter the “first indication”
or the “ second indication”, in the TRIPS. It can be argued that developing
countries could benefit from the patentability of new uses either because the
identification of new uses may be more affordable than the development of new
active ingredients, or because new uses could be directed at specific local
diseases or maladies. Thus it is right for China to protect the “first indication” and
the “second indication” of a known product in a restricted way.
5.1.4  Methods for Treatment and Diagnostics
Article 27.3(a) of TRIPS allows members to refuse patenting therapeutic method,
method for diagnostics and surgical treatment, including their application to
animals. 228 Most countries do not grant patents to such methods, due to ethical
reasons or to difficulties in actually enforcing those patents. In addition, a method
that is applied to the human body or animals is not considered industrially
applicable. If patents are granted to diagnostic or therapeutic methods, they may
negatively affect low-income patients' access to required treatments. 229
 “Methods for treatment and diagnostic” are excluded from patentable subject
matters in China as well. 230 The method of diagnosis is defined as “the process of
discerning, studying and determining sickness within the human body or animal
body”.231 The method of treatment is defined as “ the process of blocking,
relieving or eliminating the illness of living human being or animals for the purpose
of restoring health or relieving pain”. 232 Method of treatment includes surgical
method, medicine treatment, physiological treatment and method of immunization
etc. 233
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In China, there are mainly two considerations behind the exclusion: one is the
consideration of humanitarian and public morality. It is considered to be the
freedom of the doctors to make use of all methods for treatment and diagnostic in
saving lives of human beings. Another consideration is the lacking of industrial
applicability. These methods are directed at human or animal body so that could
not attain industrial applicability in China.234
The practice in China is fully consistent with the TRIPS requirement and similar to
the common practice among countries.
5.1.5 Claims
Patent claims essentially consist of a one-sentence definition of the invention
where the technical contribution made by the inventor should be unambiguously
spelled out. The scope of patent protection (the exclusive rights of the inventor)
and, therefore, the room left for independent research and competition of the third
party, is determined by the wording used in claims.
Some countries accept, under certain conditions, functional claims whereby the
invention is described in terms of what it does rather than what it is. Such claims
can allow extremely broad coverage, since they confer exclusive rights on any
methods that is appropriate to achieve the claimed functions, i.e., all ways of
solving a problem are protected. Functional claims have generally been admitted
in the US, though broad functional language that may impede further research,
and development has been condemned. 235 The EPO on the other hand, accepts
functional claims only when there is no other means to describe the invention in a
more precise manner.
Another form of claims is the so-called product-by-process claim, 236where a
product is characterized by the process by which it is obtained and not by its
elements or structure. These claims are in particular relevant to biological
products that cannot be described in terms of their structure, for instance, where a
macromolecule is secreted by a micro- organism. "Product-by-process" claims
are generally admitted by the EPO and some European countries only if it is
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impossible to define a product by its structural features, 237and if the product
obtained is new and inventive. Under "product-by-process" claims, protection is
generally only extended to a product obtained with the claimed process; hence, if
the same product were obtained by another process, it would not infringe the
existing “product-by-process” claim. 238
Use-bound claims protect the use rather than the product. An infringement of a
use-bound claim can only occur when a product is prepared or sold for the
specific use claimed in the patent.
In China, claims are divided into two groups: the claim for product and the claim
for method. Claim for product includes the claim for rights in products,
substances, instruments, tools or other things. It had better be described by
composition or structural terms of the product. The claim for method includes
claim for rights in method of production, method of use or method of
communication, disposal and all other methods. Claim for method may be
described by process or procedure. 239
Functional description of a claim for product is prohibited unless there is no other
way to describe the product or the functional description is the clearest way to
describe the product. Overtly broad protection in the functional claim than what
has been described in the explanation240 shall be prevented. For instance, if there
is only one way of fulfilling particular function has been described in the
explanation, other unknown methods fulfilling the same function shall not be
protected under this functional claim. 241Purely function claim for a product,
accepted in the US patent practice, is not allowed in China.
The so-called “use-bound” claim is actually one patentable subject matter in
China. Use-bound claim can be eligible as use patent in China, provided the claim
is written in correct form. This point has been explained in 5.1.3 of this paper.
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In the pharmaceutical field, Chemical compounds, as products, shall be claimed
by its name and structure. 242Chemical composition shall be claimed by its
structure. Moreover, Claims for chemical compositions used in pharmaceutical
field need to be restricted by its use.243 Pharmaceutical composition is deemed as
use invention of certain chemical compound in China. Therefore, the protecting
scope for pharmaceutical composition shall be limited by its use. 244Only when the
chemical compounds or composition cannot be defined or cannot be clearly
defined by its name and structure, they may be defined by its method of
producing (so-called product-by process claim), provided the new method of
production renders the concerning compound new characteristics or new effect.
245
Micro-organism, if it is patentable subject matter, shall be claimed by both its
Latin and Chinese name as well as its place of deposition. 246Genes shall be
claimed by its sequence, or method of producing when the sequence of the gene
is not available. 247
A claim is particularly relevant to health-related inventions, due to the prevailing
practices of patenting in this area. Recently, scholars have warned that overly
broad patents in the field of biotechnology could remove important research tools
from the public domain and block the whole area from further research. 248 The
broad protection sometimes conferred in the case of inventions related to
pharmaceuticals has also been questioned.249 Acceptance of broad coverage
claims expands the domain under the control of patent owners. Broad claims may
have a negative impact on research and could unduly block competition. They are
also likely to lead to a great number of legal conflicts, ultimately increasing the
costs for companies and consumers.
TRIPS keeps silent on claims. Narrowing the scope of patents through strict claim
description and coverage requirements creates more room for innovation and
competition. China does well in this aspect. Functional claim is not permitted,
pharmaceutical compositions should be restricted by its use and all claims should
be consistent with what has been disclosed in the explanation. Giving these
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restrictions, overtly broad claim in the pharmaceutical field is not likely to be
accepted in China.
5.1.6  Disclosure
Patents grant temporary monopolies to inventors in exchange for public disclosure
of the invention. The full disclosure of the invention is a basic principle of patent
law. Access to the information of the invention is one of the traditional
justifications for granting exclusive rights to the inventor.
Moreover, disclosure is directly related to the scope of claims. Normally claims
shall not be broader than what has been disclosed in the application documents.
250 The  practice is the same in China. 251
In order to perform its informative function, disclosure should ensure that the
invention be understood and be executed by an expert with average skills in the
same technological field. 252 In China, disclosure has to be understood by the
average skilled person.253 In the pharmaceutical field, chemical compound and
chemical composition shall be disclosed by theirs name and structure to the extent
that the average skilled person may obtain the substance.254 For chemical
composition, besides disclosing its name and structure, proportion of different
ingredients in the composition shall also be disclosed. 255
In China, more importantly, the disclosure is required to teach the average skilled
person in the same technological field to carry out the invention and solve the
targeted technological problems. 256 In the pharmaceutical field, At least one
method of reproduction and one method of use shall be disclosed for both
chemical compound and composition. Even for the new chemical compound, at
least one way of use shall be provided. 257 Moreover, for chemical compounds
and compositions that are used for medicine, their effect and method of use shall
be disclosed to a certain extent to enable the average skilled person to use the
invention on patients. 258
Article 29 of TRIPS deals with disclosure. According to the article, members may
require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention
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known to the inventor at the filing or at the priority date of the application. This
standard only requires the applicant to submit the best information known at the
date of the application or priority. Information available at that time rarely includes
the actual expertise for executing the invention, since production has seldom
started at that time.259 The practice in China further requires that methods of
carrying out the invention should be fully disclosed. In the pharmaceutical field, the
disclosure requirement is even higher. The disclosure requirement in China is high
enough to ensure carrying out the invention. Moreover, a high disclosure
requirement can eliminate the vagueness in claims and prevent protecting overtly
broad claims. 260
5.2  Patentability
To apply a patent, an inventor must show that the invention is novel, manifests an
"inventive step" (that the invention was non-obvious) and is industrially applicable.
The manner in which these criteria are defined and applied is crucial to determine
the pool of knowledge that is subtracted from the public domain. 261
Patentability is acutely important for pharmaceuticals. The registration of a large
number of patents on pharmaceutical compositions, therapeutic uses, polymorphs,
processes, and forms of administration relating to an active ingredient often permit
companies to create a high barrier against competition. If aggressively enforced
through "strategic," 262 or even "sham" litigation practices, 263 multinationals can
discourage competition by local companies. Additionally, secondary patents may
extend the market power conferred by the original patent. 264 Such abuses may
be particularly severe in developing countries where there is a lack or limited
tradition in controlling such practices under antitrust regulations.
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It is hard to undo overly broad patents and secondary patents. Once a patent has
been granted, it is presumed valid. Challenging parties bear the burden of proving
that the patent was wrongly issued. Consumers and small pharmaceutical
companies, especially in developing countries, rarely have the resources to
challenge overly broad patents, though they bear the cost in higher product prices,
and decreased access to patented goods. 265
The flexibility in applying patentability criteria may vary from country to country
and over time. The correct interpretation and application of patentability are
crucial for balancing public and private interests. The eligibility standards for
novelty and inventive step determine the extent to which free competition
prevails.266
Less technologically advanced countries may prefer to set higher standards of
novelty and inventive step in order to preserve and enhance competition without
violating minimum international standards. In doing so, they would simply follow
the footsteps of many of today's advanced countries, which adopted similar
policies when they were themselves developing countries.267
Developing countries should notice that high standards of novelty and inventive
step can also work against local innovators who cannot meet these standards.
One way to address the problem is to adopt a sui generis system that deals with
"minor" inventions that fail to meet the patent standard of novelty or inventive step.
European countries include sui generis industrial design laws that protect
appearance designs, and utility model laws that protect "minor" inventions
generally. 268 They could be good models.
5.2.1 Novelty
The patent system was conceived to reward inventors for contributions to the
pool of existing knowledge. The criteria used to define what is new are crucial to
the scope of possible limitations to the free access and use of technical knowledge
in the public domain. The test of novelty considers how much distance separates
one claimed invention from prior art. It applies before the test of inventive step. 269
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The novelty requirement in modern patent laws is based on an assessment of the
prior art on a universal basis, that is, the prior art anywhere in the world.
Generally, novelty is destroyed by previous written publication, prior use, or any
other form of public communication.
In China, novelty means the difference from all prior art before the filing date.
Prior art in China includes all information in publications, prior use and information
communicated to the public through other ways (mainly oral ways) before the
filing date.270 The geographic scope of the “prior art” is different. Publication all
over the world is prior art.271 Prior use includes manufacturing, utilizing, selling,
importing or modelling the claimed invention within China. 272 Other ways
(mainly oral ways) of communicating to the public includes communication in
conferences and seminars, oral reporting and broadcasting through radio or
television within China. 273 It is similar to the practice in the US. 274
In some cases, disclosure may not have been made explicit in a prior writing, but
may be implicit therein. If the novelty test based only on explicitly disclosed
information, then equivalents to an invention implicitly disclosed in the prior art can
be novel. The result can be patenting of pieces of existing knowledge that are
already contained in the prior art.275 In China, inventions that can be directly
deducted from information in prior art are considered lack of novelty.276 Thus
implicit disclosure in prior art can destroy the novelty of the invention. It is very
similar to the patent practice of EPO. 277
When comparing the invention in application with counterparts in prior art, China
adopts the principle of separate comparison. Every claim shall be compared with
respective technological information in prior art separately. Information in different
publications shall not be combined together to destroy the novelty of the
invention.278 It is similar to the practice in the US.279 However, in the inventive
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step test, information in prior art shall be combined together in the mind of an
average skilled person to destroy the patentability of the invention. 280
In the pharmaceutical field, another important question is whether novelty would
only be destroyed when the information in prior art enabled the execution of the
invention, or whether a mere disclosure in the prior art would be sufficient.281 It is
very crucial issue concerning what kind of prior art may destroy the novelty of
chemical substances in the pharmaceutical field.
In China, if information in prior art is sufficient enough to enable an ordinary
skilled person to repeatedly obtain the same chemical compound or composition,
the novelty of the compound or composition is thus destroyed. If the prior art
cannot enable execution, even if there is complete information (name, structure
and physical, chemical data) of a chemical substance, its novelty cannot be
destroyed. 282
5.2.2  Inventive Step
An invention, even if novel, is not patentable if its technical teaching could have
been discovered in due course by a person with average skills in the respective
field. Many countries' case law holds that there is no inventive step if it would be
obvious for a person with average skills to test new matter with a significant
likelihood of success. The inventive step or non-obvious requirement is critical to
prevent the granting of patents to trivial inventions. It is the essential requirement
to balance contribution and remuneration. 283
The TRIP is not specific with the issue of inventive step. Article 27.1 of the
TRIPS establishes that patents shall be granted to protect inventions, which
"involve an inventive step" and in a footnote, it allows member countries to
interpret "inventive step" as synonymous to "non- obvious."284 A possible option
for developing countries is to define and apply strict criteria for inventive step, in
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order to avoid the granting of patents to trivial inventions that may unduly block
competition in health-related products and processes.
In China, “inventive step” means that characteristics of the invention are not
obvious to the average skilled person in the respective technology field.285
Moreover, the invention should have corrected defects in respective technology
of the prior art, be alternative technological method or representing the trend of
technological development.286
In China, the average skilled person in a respective technology field is defined as
a person that knows all relevant prior art and has the normal ability of
experimenting and researching. However he has no ability of inventing. 287In this
way, the invention is compared with all prior art in the mind of the average skilled
person. If the average skilled person is able to make the same invention, using
logical analysis or limited experiments based on his knowledge of prior art and
experimenting/researching ability, the invention thus has no inventive step. The
inventive step test in China is almost exactly the same as the non-obvious test in
the US. 288
In establishing the existence of inventive step, it is necessary to consider not only
the knowledge derived from a single prior document, but also the combined
knowledge of existing literature, patent documents, and other prior art. In China,
inventive step test adapts the principle of “combining comparison”. Respective
technological information recorded in any document shall be compared with each
claim in the application; all relevant technological information in the prior art shall
be combined together to be compared with the respective claim in the invention.
289
We should also notice that though the unexpected or surprising effect of the
invention is considered a strong indication or evidence of inventive step in China,
however it is not indispensable in the “inventive step” test. 290 On the other hand,
the so-called “doctrine of sweat of brow” in the US patent practice is not
applicable in China. The Guideline explicitly states that the inventive step test shall
not consider whether the invention is achieved through painstaking laboring or it is
simply serendipity. 291China adapts an objective approach in the inventive step
test.
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In the pharmaceutical field, there is often a close structural relationship between a
compound that is claimed as new and inventive, and known compounds, such as
salts of acids, bases, isomers, and homologues. In these cases, the new
compounds are often deemed obvious thus not patentable.
In China, If a newly found chemical compound has the similar structure of any
known compound, it should have unexpected use or effect to fulfill the inventive
step requirement. On the other hand, if this chemical compound has totally
different structure from all known compounds, unexpected use or effect is not
required to pass the inventive step test.  292 It is the same practice as the EPO, 293
however different from the practice of the US.  294
As for the use claim of chemical substances, it is divided into the use of known
substance and unknown substances. The use of known substances shall have new
function, positive effect based on the new function and also the function shall not
be obviously obtained through the structure of the known substance. The use of
unknown substance is easy to fulfill the inventive step requirement since only
positive effect and that the use shall not be obviously obtained from similar
known substances are required. 295 The rules for chemical substances are also
applicable to micro-organisms and genes.296
5.2.3  Industrial Applicability
Patent law around the world aims to protect technical solutions to a given
problem, not abstract knowledge. Thus inventions should be industrially
applicable. 297
Countries differ in their standards of industrial applicability. In U.S., certain
developments that do not lead to an industrial product may be patented: an
invention only needs to be useful. 298This usefulness concept is broader than the
"industrial applicability" concept that is required in Europe and other countries.
The U.S. permits the patentability of purely experimental inventions that cannot be
made or used in an industry, or that do not produce a technical effect, 299 as
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illustrated by the large number of patents granted in the U S on "methods of doing
business." 300
China uses the wording “usefulness” in its patent legislation instead of industrial
applicability.  The “Usefulness” in China means that the invention must be able to
be manufactured or utilized in respective economic sections by the ordinary
skilled person and has positive technological effect. The usefulness of the
invention is examined before the novelty and inventive step test. 301 The invention
shall be able to be repeatedly carried out by the ordinary skilled person. The
results and technological effect should be the same or at least similar.302 The
“repeatability” requirement is essential part of the “usefulness” test.  303 For
example, an invention that is created under unique natural environment and cannot
be repeated by ordinary skilled person is not “useful” in China.304
The concept of usefulness in China is quite abroad, though not as abroad as the
concept in the US.  305Although the useful test in China requires technological
effect, product invention manufactured in laboratory, not necessarily be
industrialized, can qualify as useful. If the method invention can be utilized in
respective economic section, not necessarily industrially applicable, use patent can
be granted. 306
TRIPS does not define the concept of industrial applicability and, therefore,
leaves member states with considerable flexibility. 307 In order to avoid the
proliferation of patents that may unduly jeopardize innovation and competition in
the health sector, patent laws may provide as precise a concept of industrial
applicability as possible. The broad “usefulness” concept used in China seems not
suitable for a developing county. 308 Thus China had better raise its standard of
usefulness. Product invention should be able to be turned into industrial products
and method invention should be industrially applicable to pass the test of
usefulness.
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5.2.4  Special Issues Relevant to Pharmaceutical Patents
Several issues relating to the application of patentability requirements may be
specific to health-related inventions. WTO member countries retain a
considerable degree of flexibility in addressing most of them. These issues may be
appropriately treated in implementing regulations and guidelines for the patent
office, rather than in the law itself.
Developing countries, particularly those for the first time patenting pharmaceutical
inventions, should carefully design policy in these areas to ensure that patents are
granted to real contributions to the prior art and to avoid granting patents to trivial
invention. Poor drafting or administration of patent laws may impede competition
and permit abusive practices that illegitimately extend patent protection beyond
the twenty- year term required by the TRIPS.
5.2.4.1 Selection Patent
A "selection patent" is a patent under which a single element or a small segment
within a large known group is "selected" and independently claimed, based on a
particular feature not mentioned in the large group. 309 If the large group of
elements is already patented, 310 the patent owner may use the selection patent to
extend the term of protection beyond the expiration of the original patent, at least
for the selected subset.
While accepted in some jurisdictions when the selected elements possess a
surprising advantage, selection patents have been denied when the supposed
advantage is a property shared by all or most subset of the large group.311 An
important policy issue is, therefore, to decide if and under which conditions
selection patents should be admitted. TRIPS leaves full discretion to national laws
in this area.
In China, the selection patent shall have unique feature and unexpected
technological effect to fulfill the requirement of inventive step. Moreover, such
unique feature and unexpected effect of the selection would not be logically
inferred by the average skilled person from the information of the known large
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group. Otherwise, the selection cannot fulfill the inventive step requirement. 312
The Chinese standard for selection patent is reasonably high. Not only a unique
feature of the selection is required, but also the unique feature of the selection
patent should not be obvious to an average skilled person.
5.2.4.2  Analogy Processes
Some countries have permitted patenting of non-novel processes, sometimes
called analogy processes, provided that the resulting chemical substance is novel
and displays unexpected properties.
The US has held "analogy process" claims to be unpatentable unless they are
inventive in themselves, 313 but it has carved out an exception for biotechnology.
The products and processes of biotechnology have posed problems for applying
the inventive step standard, since many biotechnology "inventions" repeat
previously invented processes in slightly different contexts. This problem led to a
statutory amendment of U.S. law in 1995, which lowered the non-obvious
standard by deeming a biotech process claim non-obvious if it involves new and
non-obvious starting materials or produces a new and non-obvious result.  314
 While the protection of "analogy processes" has been accepted in many
jurisdictions as a logical means of protecting new developments, no country is
obliged under TRIPS to follow this approach of expanding the realm of
patentable subject matter.
There is no explicit provision dealing with analogy processes in Chinese patent
legislation. Thus the SPO should deal with analogy process in the traditional way.
The resulting novel chemical substance can be patented. However the analogy
process itself, since it is not novel, cannot be patented as process patent. As for
analogy process in the biotechnology field, China should keep an eye on the
practice of developed countries, however be cautious and critical to any radical
practice.
5.3  Exceptions to Exclusive Rights
All national patent laws contain exceptions to the exclusive rights granted by a
patent. The content and scope of these exceptions vary widely. Some exceptions
are particularly relevant to the health area. All of the exceptions considered below
are recognized in some form in many developed countries. Article 30 of TRIPS
treats the exceptions issue in general terms and leaves WTO member states with
considerable freedom to define the nature and extent of exceptions.
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315Comparative law reveals that different types of exceptions may be provided for
within the scope of article 30.316 Outright exceptions to the exclusive rights of a
patent, which operate without the need of specific authorization by a court or
other authorities, and in favor of any third party, may be extremely important in
fostering innovation, promoting the diffusion of technologies or facilitating access
to health-related goods at the lowest possible prices.
Exceptions of exclusive rights are even more important than all strategies we have
provided in the parts of patent subject matters and patentability. Subject matters
and patentability shall be applied to local and foreign inventions on equal basis. As
for the exceptions, many of them, like compulsory license and parallel
importation, maybe applied in a way that is in favor of the local industry, provided
that the legislation itself is not discriminatory. Experimental use and early working
could be used by the local industry in a proper way competing with the foreign
pharmaceutical industry. The latter has been substantiated even in the practice of
the Chinese pharmaceutical industry.
5.3.1 Experimental Use
A basic objective of the patent law is to promote innovation. However, overly
broad patent rights may harm innovation. 317 One mechanism to address the
problem is permitting the use of the invention without compensation to the owner
for experimentation. Experimental use may foster technological progress based on
"inventing around" and improving protected invention. It also permits evaluating an
invention in order to grant a license, or for other legitimate purposes, such as to
test whether the patent is valid. 318 Although the experimental use is rather narrow
in the US, 319many countries, notably in Europe, explicitly authorize experimenting
on an invention without the consent of the patent holder, for scientific purposes.
320
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The 2000 Amendment explicitly provides that “using relevant patents exclusively
for the purpose of scientific research and experiments shall not be deemed as
infringement of the exclusive rights of the patent holder”. 321 No further
explanation on this issue exists in the Implementing Regulation or in the Guideline.
At least, however, we may deduct from the wording of “exclusively for the
purpose of” that experimental use shall not be used for commercial purpose when
the patent has not expired.
Whether the experimental user should obtain the authorization of the patent holder
is not clear in China. According to the general practice in different domestic
patent legislations, authorization for experimental use is not practicable and not
necessary, since experimental use will not affect the patent holder’s exclusive
rights of commercial exploitation. Thus we are inclined to suggest that for
experimental use in China one need not obtain the authorization of the patent
holder.
However, whether the result of the experimental use can be used for commercial
purpose after expiration of the patent still remains as a question in Chinese patent
legislation. This question relates to the issue “early working” and shall be
discussed in 5.3.2 of this paper.
5.3.2  Early Working
Another exception specifically applicable to pharmaceutical patents is early
working: using an invention without the patentee's authorization for the purpose of
obtaining approval of a generic product before the patent expiration date. Early
working may permit marketing of a generic version of the product promptly after
the patent expires. Since generic competition generally lowers prices, 322 this
exception promotes the affordability of off-patent medicines. The availability of
generics either under a brand name (branded generics) or a generic name
(commodity generics) would lead to increased competition in the pharmaceutical
market, and to correspondingly lower prices for the consumers and improved
affordability of drugs. 323
Given that commercialization of the generic product does not take place until after
the expiration of the patent, the early working exception can be regarded as fully
compatible with article 30 of TRIPS. In the case of Canada, the law provided for
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early working that not only allows tests with the invention, but also producing and
stockpiling of the product for release immediately after the expiration of the
patent. 324 The European Union requested a panel against Canada under the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism in connection with this exception. The panel
decision confirmed that an early working exception is consistent with TRIPS.
However, the panel considered that the right to manufacture and stockpile before
the expiration of the patent was not consistent with TRIPS. 325 Manufacturing and
stockpiling products are commercial exploitation in conflict with the exclusive
rights of the patent holder. Thus it was reasonable for the panel to rule that the
Canadian early working system, which allows even manufacturing and stockpiling,
was partly inconsistent with the TRIPS.
The "early working" exception, as noted in 5.3.1, may in some cases be
considered as one type of experimental use exception. If the result of
experimental use is used for future commercial exploitation, namely commercial
exploitation after the expiration of the relevant patent, it may have the same
function as early working. Chinese patent legislation has not touched on the issue
of early working. Although China may permit using the result of the experimental
use for commercial purpose after expiration of the patent, given the importance of
early working in fostering national pharmaceutical industry and lowering medicine
price, Chinese legislators should add a specific provision on early working.
5.3.3  Parallel importation
Parallel importation involves the importation and resale in a country, without the
consent of the patent holder, of a patented product, which was put on the market
of the exporting country by the patent holder or in other legitimate manner. For
example, a company may buy a patented machine sold in Germany and then resell
it in Canada, where the same patent is in force, without the patent holder's
authorization.
Parallel importation is the second most important measure developing country
may make use of when dealing with public health crisis. This part of the paper
shall analyze the theoretical basis for parallel importation and its economic
implication first. Then relevant Chinese legislation shall be analyzed in connection
with the theoretical basis, the requirement of TRIPS and the model provisions in
the MRSCAA of South Africa.
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5.3.3.1  Doctrine of Exhaustion and its Economic Implication
 The underlying concept for allowing parallel importation is the Doctrine of
Exhaustion. Since the inventor has been rewarded through the first sale or
distribution of the product, he/she has no right to control the use or resale of
goods put on the market with their consent. In other words, the inventor's rights
have been "exhausted." 326 If the patent holder put the patented products in no
matter which country in the world and the patent concerned is exhausted, it is
called “international exhaustion”. If only marketing the patented products in a
particular region may exhaust the patent, marketing the patented products outside
of this region may not exhaust the patent, it is called  “regional exhaustion”. Also
we should bear in mind that parallel importation, where allowed, cover only
legitimate products, not counterfeited products or unauthorized products that are
put in a foreign market. 327
Parallel importation has been admitted in many developed and developing
countries, on a regional or international scale, for all or some areas intellectual
property rights. For instance, in the European Communities (EC) the European
Court of Justice has applied the doctrine of regional exhaustion of rights to the
entire EC and to different types of intellectual property rights, in order to prevent
market segmentation.  Once a patented product has been sold in an EC country,
it can be resold in any other member country without infringing the right holder's
rights. Another example is South Africa. South Africa establishes its parallel
importation system based on the international exhaustion dealing with public health
crisis under Section 15 (c) (b) of the MRSCAA.328
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In economic terms, the acceptance of parallel importation may prevent market
segmentation and price discrimination by patent holders on a regional or
international scale. In other words, parallel importation allows consumers to shop
on the world market for the lowest price for a patented good effectively. 329
Parallel importation is particularly important in the health sector, where the
pharmaceutical industry sets prices differently throughout the world for the same
medicine. Importation of a patented medicine from a country where it is sold at a
lower price will enable more patients in the importing country to gain access to the
product, without preventing the patent owner from receiving remuneration for the
patented invention in the country where the product was first sold.
On the negative side, states must evaluate the argument that there is an economic
risk that the doctrine of exhaustion may discourage price differentiation favoring
the developing countries. It has been argued that if parallel importation were to be
admitted generally, companies would tend to charge a single price worldwide,
leading to an increase in the supposedly lower price that may otherwise be
charged in low-income countries. 330 The pharmaceutical industry is concerned
with cross-market leaks that could reduce its profit margins and thereby its ability
to recoup R&D investments. For these and other reasons, states need to carefully
monitor the actual implementation of their exhaustion policy.
5.3.3.2 Chinese Legislation Concerning Parallel importation
As I have analysed in the 3.4 of this paper, TRIPS allows member states to adopt
parallel importation and leaves all issues concerning “exhaustion” to the discretion
of the domestic legislators.
In China, the 2000 Amendment grants a wide range of exclusive rights to the
patent holder, “ …except provided otherwise in this law, without the authorization
of the patent holder, any Unit (danwei) or individual shall not work the patent,
namely, shall not manufacture, use, offer for sale, sell, import the product
protected under the patent for commercial purpose, or use the patented process
or use, offer for sale, sale, import products that are directly manufactured through
the patented process.” 331
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Regarding the doctrine of exhaustion, 1992 Patent Law only provides, “ After the
first sale of the products that are manufactured, imported by the patent holder or
authorized to be manufactured or imported by the patent holder, or after the first
sale of products manufactured through the patented process, using, offering for
sale or selling of these products shall not be deemed as infringement of the
exclusive rights of the patent holder.” 332
There are at least two main defects in provisions concerning exhaustion and
parallel importation in the 2000 Amendment. First, the “first sale” mentioned in
the provision of “exhaustion” is first sale in any place in the world or only within a
certain region has not been made clear. From the perspective of facilitating
parallel importation, we should interpret the “first sale” as “first sale in any place
of the world”. In other words, we should adopt “international exhaustion”.
Secondly, after the first sale, only “using, offering for sale or selling” of patented
products shall not be deemed as infringement of the exclusive rights of the patent
holder. Importation of patented products has not been included in the rights that
have been exhausted by the first sale. It is reasonable to surmise that Article 63(1)
implies that even after the first sale of the patented products, importing of these
products that are legitimately put on foreign markets shall still be subject to the
consent of the patent holder. Article 63(1) of the 2000 Amendment has excluded
the possibility of parallel importation in China. We should   include importation in
rights that are exhausted by the first sale.
Even so, the Chinese government may still import patented products in need
under certain grounds of compulsory license, such as state emergency or public
interests, because importation patented products could be one way of carrying
out compulsory license. This method shall be discussed in 5.4.4.6 of this paper.
However, this kind of importation is not parallel importation since it is not based
on the exhaustion of the patent.
5.3.4 Compulsory License
Compulsory license enables a government to license the right to use a patent to a
company, government agency or other party without the patent holder's consent.
A compulsory license must be granted by a competent authority to a designated
person, who should generally compensate the title-holder through payment of
remuneration. Compulsory licenses do not deny patent holders the right to act
against non-licensed parties.
The provision of compulsory licenses is a crucial element in a health- sensitive
patent law. Such licenses may constitute an important tool to promote competition
and increase the affordability of drugs, while ensuring that the patent owner
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obtains compensation for the use of the invention. The use of such licenses,
however, has been generally opposed by the research-based pharmaceutical
industry, on the grounds that they discourage investment and R&D. 333
Most countries, including developed countries, make available some forms of
compulsory licenses. 334 Such licenses are one of the mechanisms that states can
use in order to promote competition and access to drugs. Although it is advisable
that national laws provide for a compulsory licensing system (as further elaborated
below), it should be borne in mind that such a system is not intended to, and
cannot fix problems arising from the defective granting of patents, such as when
the novelty or inventive step requirements are not satisfied. It is of crucial
importance to ensure that the patentability criteria are rigorously defined and
applied in the pre-grant process.
Compulsory licenses are generally available for lack or insufficiency of working,
335 to remedy anticompetitive practices, for cases of emergency, governmental or
"crown" use, and for other public interest grounds. Grounds of granting
compulsory license are not restricted to these that have been mentioned in the
TRIPS. Most developed countries provide for grounds of using compulsory
licenses. Many developing countries that have recently revised their patent laws
have also defined a more or less comprehensive list of reasons for granting
compulsory licenses.336
5.3.4.1 Compulsory License in Chinese Patent Legislation
There are three grounds of granting compulsory license in the Chinese Patent
Law. First, when a Unit (Danwei) has made efforts to obtain authorization from
the patent holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and has not
obtained authorization within a reasonable period of time, the Patent Bureau may
grant compulsory license to the Unit.337 Secondly, when there is state emergency,
special situation or for the sake of public interests, the Patent Bureau may grant
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compulsory license. 338 Thirdly, if a new patent, which is of significant commercial
value and inventive step, whose exploitation has to be based on exploitation of a
former patent, the Patent Bureau has the right to grant compulsory license upon
application of the new patent holder. The first patentee is entitled to cross-license
on reasonable terms.339
These three grounds of granting compulsory license are submitted to procedural
restrictions: When granting compulsory license, the Patent Bureau is obliged to
notify the respective patent holder. Each compulsory license shall have its scope
and duration. When the causation of the compulsory license terminates, the Patent
Bureau should terminate the compulsory license upon application of the patent
holder. 340 Furthermore, the rights of the compulsory licensee are non-exclusive
and not assignable. 341 Reasonable remuneration to be paid to the patent holder is
a must and should be based on negotiation between the patent holder and the
licensee. 342Any Unit may apply for compulsory license three years after the
granting of any patent. 343 The exploitation of the patent under a compulsory
licensing shall predominantly be for the purpose of fulfilling the demands of
domestic market.344
Either the compulsory license or the remuneration is subjected to judicial
challenge. Disputes over compulsory license or its remuneration is first subject to
administrative arbitration of the Patent Bureau and then subjected to judiciary
decision of respective People’s Court.345
No provision concerning compulsory license exists in the pharmaceutical
administrative protection regime.
5.3.4.2  More Grounds needed
As presented above, only three grounds are provided for granting compulsory
license in China: (1) the failure of obtaining licensing under the reasonable
commercial terms; (2) exploitation of a new patent that is based on the previous
patent: (3) in the public emergency or for the public interests. Comparing with
Article 31 of TRIPS, it is obvious that these grounds are copies of respective
provisions in the TRIPS.
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In our view, it is not wise for the Chinese legislators to provide only three grounds
that are explicitly exemplified in the TRIPS. TRIPS does not require that these
grounds are acceptable. Other grounds of granting compulsory license, if they
comply with conditions in article 30 and 31of TRIPS, are also acceptable. 346
As we have seen in the 1970 Indian Patent Act and South Africa MRSCAA,
grounds for granting compulsory license are different from those provided in the
TRIPS. 347In India, if the patent could not fulfill the reasonable demand of the
public, compulsory license may be granted. 348In South Africa, if there is a public
health crisis, the Ministry of Health may take all measures necessary to obtain
affordable drugs to relieve the crisis. Compulsory license may be granted and
parallel importation may be authorized. 349 Both grounds are provided in an
abstract way so that the government may fit different situations into them.
Public non-commercial use and correcting anti-competition practices are another
two widely accepted grounds that TRIPS allows however cannot be found in the
Chinese patent law. Besides adding new grounds for compulsory licensing, the
people’s court may also interpret abstract ground such as “public interests” in a
flexible way.
5.3.4.3  Discrimination or Differentiation
Addressing public health crisis through compulsory license have existed in
domestic legislations for long time. 350Mainly there are two different approaches.
First, national legislations explicitly grant governments the authority of granting
compulsory license when public health crisis rises. Thus compulsory license is
directly relating to pharmaceutical patents. The South Africa compulsory license
system addressing the AIDS/HIV crisis established by the MASCAA is a typical
example. 351In the second approach, public health crisis or demand for affordable
medicine is not the specific ground for granting compulsory license. Grounds such
as state emergency or public interests are broadly interpreted to include public
health crisis. In this way, the ground for compulsory license is not directly in
relation to pharmaceutical patents. The test of “reasonable demand of the public”
in the 1970 Indian Patent Act is an example. When public health crisis rises,
working of certain patents may be deemed as having not met the reasonable
demand of the public. So a compulsory license maybe justified. 352
In the TRIPS, all grounds of granting compulsory license shall be subject to non-
discrimination provision-Article 27(1). Grounds having the effect of discrimination
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shall be prohibited under TRIPS. Compulsory license system directly dealing with
the public health crisis, like the one established by the MRSCAA in the South
Africa, is very likely to be challenged by the pharmaceutical industry as
discrimination, since in dealing with public health, pharmaceutical patents are most
likely to be licensed. 353
This problem has already been solved by the DSB in the Canadian Case. The
panel makes it clear that first, not all differentiation on grounds of granting
compulsory license is prohibited. Only those of a discriminating effect are
prohibited. Secondly, specific compulsory licensing system in relation to public
health crisis could be bona fide system that has no discrimination effect, though
they are always specifically in relation to pharmaceutical patents. The holding of
the Panel makes it clear that even the compulsory license system directly in
relation to the pharmaceuticals is not necessarily to be deemed as discriminatory
354
Chinese patent legislation has not granted the government the authority of granting
compulsory license when a public health crisis arises. However, emergency and
public interests are established grounds for compulsory licensing in the patent law.
355 It is recommended to adopt the second approach mentioned above, namely,
including public health crisis as a ground of the emergency.
5.3.4.4  Correcting Anti-Competition Practice
Article 40 of the TRIPS allows member states to take measures necessary to deal
with the anti-competition practices in relation to abusing intellectual property
rights.356 Compulsory license could be an effective measure in correcting anti-
unfair competition practices such as exclusive grant back conditions, conditions
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing. 357The practice
of using compulsory license correcting anti-unfair competition has long been
existed in national legislations. 358Though relatively little compulsory license has
been granted in this regard, 359 the practical value of the existence of compulsory
license provisions in the Patent Law is that it has a threatening effect. It usually
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induces the grant of contractual licenses on reasonable terms, and thus the
objective of actually working the invention is accomplished." 360
Unfortunately, the Chinese anti-unfair Competition law has not made use of
Article 40 of TRIPS. It has not touched the issue of anti-unfair competition
practices in relation with abusing the patent or other intellectual property rights.
361Besides the ground of public interests for compulsory license in the Chinese
Patent Law, which maybe temporarily used to deal with anti-competition
practices, China also needs the particular ground of correcting anti-competition
practices. In our view, the reasons lie in three aspects. First, Compulsory license
granted on the ground of correcting anti-competition practice need not to be
submitted to the restriction in (b) and (f) of Article 30 TRIPS. 362 This point has
been clarified in 3.3 of this paper. Secondly, as we know, China is on the way
towards establishing a socialist market economy. Enhancing legislations
guaranteeing a fair and healthy market environment is especially important in this
process. Thirdly, since most of the pharmaceutical patents in China are held by
large multinational enterprises, the multinational enterprises are very likely to
unduly take advantage of their dominant market position. From the perspective of
protecting immature national pharmaceutical industry, China should consider
regulating anti-competition practices relating to abusing patent rights by foreign
competitors.
5.3.4.5 Working Requirement and Local Working Requirement
“Working requirement” means that if a patent is not worked by the patent holder
and the patent holder also has not authorized other people to work it in a
reasonable period, the government may grant compulsory license on the patent.
“Working requirement” has not been prohibited by the article 30 and 31 of the
TRIPS. 363Also in the article 5 of the Paris Convention, “lack of working” is the
only exemplified ground of granting compulsory license, provided there has been
a grace period of three or four years. 364
Some domestic patent legislations, such as the 1970 Indian Patent Act, further
requires that the patent should be locally worked to fulfill the demand of the
domestic market. Under 1970 Indian Patent Act, if patent that has been granted
has not been sufficiently worked in India, even though importation is used to fulfill
the reasonable demand of the general public, compulsory license also could be
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granted to the domestic industry. 365The legal measure could be called “local
working requirement”.
However, the far-reaching non-discrimination clause -Article 27 (1) of TRIPS
provides, “…patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether
products are imported or locally produced.” 366Whether the “local working
requirement” in the 1970 Indian Patent Act is discrimination between “products
imported or locally produced “is not clear. In our opinion, if the patent holder
simply intents to use the patent to prevent domestic industry from producing
similar products, namely he has not worked the patent locally and even has not
imported the products, thus the demand of the domestic market has not been met,
the government may grant compulsory license to a local industry. If the patent
holder has not worked the patent locally, however has imported products to fulfill
the demands of the domestic market, it seems that the government has no right to
grant a compulsory license, since there are imported products to meet the
demand of domestic market and Article 27(1) provides that patent rights shall be
enjoyed without discrimination as to imported products or locally produced
counterparts. Thus “local working requirement” in the 1970 Indian Patent Act is
partly inconsistent with the TRIPS, according to our analysis.
In the 1984 Chinese Patent Law, “local working requirement” existed. However,
upon the amendment in 1992, there is no “local working requirement” nor does
“working requirement” exists. In the pharmaceutical administrative protection
regime, there is no “working requirement”.367 Before the TRIPS came into force
to India, the generic pharmaceutical industry in India benefits a lot from the
provision of the “local working requirement”. TRIPS shall enter into force to
China at the end of 2002. In the series of intellectual property agreements
between US and China, there is no provision restricting the use of “working
requirement”. We suggest that Chinese legislators may authorize the government
to grant compulsory license when working of certain patents is not enough to
meet the demand of domestic market. In compliance with Article 27 of the
TRIPS, if the patent holder has imported products to meet the demand of the
domestic market, the compulsory license should not be granted.
5.3.4.6  Importation and Exportation under Compulsory License
TRIPS has not eliminated the possibility that a compulsory license may be
executed by means of importing patented products. 368 This may, in fact, be the
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only viable means to execute a compulsory license in cases where the capacity of
the local market does not justify local working, or where there is a need to
promptly address emergent situation like public health crisis.
The Chinese Patent Legislation does not provide specific ways of executing
compulsory license. According to 2000 Amendment, Unit that has qualified
competence may obtain compulsory license from the Patent Bureau to make use
of the patent. 369 The law has not clarified in what way the compulsory licensee
may make use of the patent. May the licensee import patented products instead
of manufacture them? The ambiguity of the law grants the government flexibility to
allow compulsory licensee to import patented products concerned. As analyzed in
5.3.3.2 of this paper, the possibility of parallel importation under current Chinese
patent legislation has been eliminated by defects in the exhaustion provision.
370Thus importing patented products under compulsory license appears to be
even more important.
A further question is whether a compulsory licensee may export licensed
products. TRIPS provides that compulsory license must be "predominantly" for
the purpose of supplying domestic market. 371 The Implementation Regulation of
the 1992 Patent Law has the same provision as those in the TRIPS.372 Thus,
exports of licensed products are possible in China, though it should not constitute
the main activity of the licensee. We should also note that, the “predominantly for
domestic market” restriction, however, may not apply when a compulsory license
has been granted to remedy anti-competitive practices. 373
Since compulsory license dealing with public health crisis are most possibly used
to supply the demands of the domestic market, the possibility of exporting
licensed products by the licensee, however, does not seem to be in line with the
objective of dealing with public health crisis.
5.3.4.7 Public Non-commercial Use
Public non-commercial use is the use of the compulsorily licensed patent by the
government or contractor for non-commercial purposes. Addressing public health
crisis is a typical reason for launching public non-commercial use. According to
TRIPS, in the case of public non-commercial use, the restriction of “reasonable
commercial term” on compulsory license maybe waived, provided the patent
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holder is promptly notified. Moreover, according to the practice in the US,
domestic legislation may eliminate a patent owner's right to seek an injunction to
bar the government or a government contractor from using its patent, allowing the
patent owner only the right to seek compensation. 374
There is no provision in the Chinese Patent legislation dealing with public non-
commercial use, no matter the patent is used by the government or contractors. In
judicial practice in China, compulsory license that is actually for public non-
commercial use has been granted on the grounds of state emergency or other
situations of extreme emergency. 375 However, as we have seen in TRIPS, public
non-commercial use is a specific ground of granting compulsory license other than
the ground of emergency.  It is suggested that China make use of this ground.
Public non-commercial use is also a ground that bears less procedural restriction
than other grounds of compulsory license in the TRIPS. Currently in China, all
compulsory licenses are subject to the restriction of “reasonable commercial
terms”. 376Thus China especially needs a ground such as non-commercial use,
which may not be restricted by the “reasonable commercial terms”.
5.3.4.8 Remuneration
 TRIPS only requires “adequate remuneration” and “take into account the
economic value of the authorization” when deciding the remuneration to the patent
holder. 377 In general, certain remuneration may be established on the basis of the
rates generally applicable in the respective industrial sector. 378Another possibility
is to define a "reasonable" remuneration as which a third party would pay for a
voluntary license. The latter method, introduced by U.S. law in 1922, has been
extensively applied in U.S. case law relating to the infringement of patent rights.
379 In the case of compulsory licenses for U.S. governmental use, however,
remuneration is based on what the patent holder has lost, not on what the licensee
has gained. 380
The practice in Canada (while a system of compulsory licenses was in force) was
to require remuneration of four percent of the sales price of medicines under
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license. In India, the applicable policy guidelines normally limit remuneration to a
maximum of four percent of net sales. 381
In order to determine compensation, authorities may require the patent holder to
disclose product-specific R&D investments, revenues and other relevant
economic data, while ensuring adequate protection of any confidential commercial
data. They may also take into account the domestic market share in the total
world market for the licensed product, in order to determine what proportion of
actual cost of the R&D the country should pay. In commercial practice,
remuneration usually range from 0.5% to 10% of the net sales of the licensed
product, depending on the market volume and turnover of the specific product,
382 and depending on the stage of the technology in the life cycle, among other
factors. 383
Chinese patent law only requires that the remuneration be reasonable and based
on negotiation. In accordance with the TRIPS, remuneration for compulsory
license may be subject to judicial review in China. 384 The patent law provides no
specific formula to decide what is reasonable remuneration. 385 It is suggested that
China should decide the remuneration according to the reasonable rate in the
respective industrial sector, as the general practice in most countries. At the same
time, a maximum limit should be set in case of extreme market situation.
Compulsory license for public non-commercial use should be remunerated in
accordance with the loss of the patent holder, as the practice in the US.
5.3.4.9 Duration
The duration of a compulsory license is important. If the term is too short, there
may be no incentive for a third party to request or accept a license. The general
practice is that compulsory licenses should be granted for the remaining term of
the patent. This is the solution in general, except when the compulsory license is
granted on the grounds of emergency or public interests. In the case of emergency
or public interests, the compulsory license is to be terminated when the extreme
situation, such as public health, has ended. 386
                                                
381 See David Graber, Foreign Countries' Licensing Practices (cited in USTR's Annual Trade
Barriers Report), World Licensing Law Report/BNA, No. 4, at 3 (1999)
382 See Peter Niess, Technology Evaluation and Pricing, Tech. Monitor, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at
16-17
383 See Vinay Kumar & Jyotti Bhat, Estimating Payments for Technology: A Framework for
SMEs, Tech. Monitor, Nov.-Dec. (1999)
384 Id, see also Article 31 (j) TRIPS, supra note 70
385 Article 54 of the 2000 Amendment, supra note 20
386 See Carlos E Correa, supra note 103 at 50
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In China, the duration of compulsory license should be determined in accordance
with its different grounds. Moreover, if the situation that the compulsory license
addresses ends, the compulsory license can be terminated upon application of the
patent holder, provided the situation is not likely to happen again.387 It provides
no general duration for a compulsory license. I suggest that in general, compulsory
license in China should be granted for the duration for the remaining term of the
patent.
                                                
387 See Article 52 of the 2000 Amendment, supra note 20, The latter restriction on the
duration of compulsory license only apply to those granted on the ground of emergency or
public interests.
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6 Conclusion
The evolution of Chinese patent legislation has been under constant pressure from
the US. However, China is not the only developing country under such pressure.
India, South Africa, Thailand and Brazil, among which the latter two have not
been discussed in this paper, are all developing countries facing severe threats of
trade sanction from the US. India and South Africa have struggled hard and
fruitfully for bringing about a national legislation that can foster national
pharmaceutical industry or may efficiently address public health crisis. Though
China has much more interaction with the US in intellectual property protection, it
has not taken much initiatives struggling with US in consideration of national
pharmaceutical industry or public health.
Although TRIPS is great success for developed countries, flexibility still exists in
this agreement for a developing country to take advantage of. As analysed in part
3 of this paper, certain provisions in TRIPS, together with the Doha Declaration,
leave adequate room for a developing country to establish a public-health-friendly
patent protection system.
Chinese Patent Legislation currently in force complies with the TRIPS
requirement. Actually, the 1992 Amendment of Patent Law, under the pressure of
1992 MOU, has already reached the protection level of TRIPS.  In addition, the
pharmaceutical administrative protection regime protects foreign pharmaceutical
patents granted between 1984 and 1993. So what China needs to consider now
therefore is not how to comply with the TRIPS but how to make use of the
flexibility of the TRIPS in the public health concern.
China has not made full use of the flexibility provisions in the TRIPS. Even worse,
some of the provisions are a direct copy of the TRIPS or the practice of the US,
which eliminates the possibility to be flexible. Chinese scholars are eager to
comply with advanced standards of patent protection advocated by developed
countries. However they are rarely willing to stand on the side of developing
countries. Thus the patent protection system in China needs adjustment in
different aspects, from patentability to exceptions to exclusive rights, bearing in
mind the public health concern and making use of the flexibility of the TRIPS.
This theme is what my thesis has tried to make a contribution towards.
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